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Abstract 
 
The world is shifting from a unipolar system following the end of the Cold War to 
a multipolar system that is ushered in by “the rise of the rest.”  This change in the global 
structure has led some analysts to predict an increase in nuclear weapons proliferation 
caused by increased uncertainty and a decrease in alliances and security assurances.  
Nuclear proliferation, however, will not increase because these types of predictions are 
founded upon realist assumptions that inaccurately predict the characteristics of the 
emerging multipolar system as well as inaccurately understanding calculations of states 
with regard to nuclear weapons programs.  I review a variety of literature concerning 
international politics theory and nuclear weapons forming a theoretical framework and 
use Iran and Turkey as case studies to test my hypothesis.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of motivations to pursue nuclear weapons is particularly difficult given 
the small amount of empirical evidence that is available.  Furthermore, as theories of 
international relations evolve and change over the years, so too do the theories 
concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Over the last 65 years or so, 
only a relatively small number of states have actually gone the distance in developing 
nuclear weapons despite the great number of forecasts and predictions that nuclear 
weapons would spread around the world.   
An overwhelming majority of evidence concerning the spread of nuclear weapons 
comes from the Cold War era—a time when the world was nearly split in half between 
East and West.  Most states around the world, although exceptions certainly existed, 
either aligned themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union.  Many of the 
theories of the proliferation of nuclear weapons still assume a Cold War environment, but 
the world has changed.  The international system is no longer bipolar.  States that were 
once constrained by the influence of the United Sates or Soviet Union now have much 
more freedom to pursue their own policies.  Furthermore, in the age of globalization, 
states are becoming richer and can attain technology once reserved only for the richest 
and most powerful nations.  States around the world are now challenging the power and 
influence of the United States, which was not possible just a few decades ago during the 
Cold War.  A new international system is emerging.    
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 A key neo-realist assumption is that instability increases in multipolar system, 
thus the chance of war also increases.  This assumption is reflected in many predictions 
of nuclear proliferation in the coming years.  Francis J. Gavin explains that a wide variety 
of public figures and politicians, from President Obama and Senator John McCain to 
even Thomas Schelling, have recently proclaimed that nuclear proliferation is and will be 
America’s greatest security challenge in the future.1  Indeed, the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) reflects these sentiments.  Although the NPR does not refer to the 
emerging system, or a multipolar system explicitly, it explains that the United States is 
shifting its focus to nuclear proliferation and “adapting to a changed security 
environment.”2  The NPR reflects the changes in the global system that I will be 
addressing here, including changes in security assurances and reduced constraint on states 
in the international system, but fails to address other aspects of the emerging international 
system that will have a large impact on proliferation in the future.  It explains, “A failure 
of reassurance could lead to a decision by one or more non-nuclear states to seek nuclear 
deterrents of their own, an outcome which could contribute to an unraveling of the NPT 
regime and to a greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use.”3 
                                                
1 Francis J. Gavin, "Same as it Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold 
War," International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): pp. 7-8.   
2 "Nuclear Posture Review Report." U.S. Department of Defense, p. 5.   
3 Ibid.,p. 3.   
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 A National Intelligence Council report further confirms the belief that nuclear 
weapons will spread in the future, particularly in reaction to perceived Iranian capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons.4  Further, the report claims:  
Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar 
or unipolar ones….[T]he next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught 
with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, 
and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th 
century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.5   
Among the risks the NIC outlines is an increase in nuclear proliferation, particularly in 
the Middle East.6 
Does this mean that more and more states will seek nuclear weapons in order to 
ensure security in this type of environment?  If we were to believe basic neo-realist 
assumptions, the answer would be yes.  In fact, it was my intention to demonstrate this at 
the outset of this study; however, my assumption was based on only a narrow 
understanding of the emerging international system, and a monocausal explanation of 
nuclear calculations based on the security environment of states.  
It is not my goal to determine a unified theory of proliferation, nor is it my goal to 
predict which states will and will not pursue nuclear weapons in the future.  Instead, it is 
my goal to counter the theories predicting widespread proliferation in the future caused 
by a multipolar system.  The world will be a very different place than it was during the 
Cold War, and nuclear weapons research should reflect these changes.   
                                                
4 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2008), p. 62.   
5 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. vi.   
6 Ibid., p. 61.   
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Some of the largest changes in the emerging system have nothing to do with the 
balance of power as traditionally understood.  Instead, major themes in the future will 
include economic power, globalization, and a larger emphasis on norms and ideas.  
Although states will be less constrained in the multipolar system than under the previous 
unipolar and bipolar systems, the conditions of the emerging system will influence states 
not to pursue nuclear weapons.  All too often, once analysts begin to consider what forces 
are pushing a state towards proliferation, they forget to look at the degree to which those 
factors are actually pushing and which factors are pushing back.  
Problems with Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation  
There is certainly no shortage of literature concerning the future of nuclear 
weapons.  Despite such a vast literature, it is difficult to find any two forecasts or theories 
that agree with one another.  Qualitative forecasts and theories primarily fall into two 
categories—realist and constructivist accounts.  With no surprise, realist accounts 
primarily focus on external security threats, while constructivists emphasize interests, 
ideas, and identities of states.   
As mentioned above, many look exclusively at the threats a state faces in order to 
determine whether or not it is at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons.  Scott D. Sagan warns 
against the dangers of believing only one model can explain a state’s decision to go 
nuclear.  Sagan explains that “a near consensus that the answer is obvious” exists, and 
many policymakers and scholars are complacent in believing that the decision to go 
nuclear is a direct reaction to military threats to a state’s security.7  Sagan admits that 
                                                
7 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): p. 54. 
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many, if not most, cases of proliferation, can be explained with the classic security 
model, but “multi-causality, rather than measurement error, lies at the heart of the nuclear 
proliferation problem.”8  
Even among forecasts with similar theories, vast differences in methodology 
exist. Moeed Yusuf of the Brookings institution demonstrates the history of nuclear 
forecasts and believes it a “paradox” that such a large number of forecasts of nuclear 
weapons proliferation have incorrectly predicted future proliferation.9 Yusuf explains that 
the failure is due to flaws in methodology10 and outlines 6 “broad lessons” that can be 
learned from past forecasting failures:   
1. Consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation 
2. While all the countries that did eventually develop nuclear weapons were 
on the lists of suspect states, the estimations misjudged when these 
countries would go nuclear. 
3. The pace of proliferation has been consistently slower than has been 
anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming 
alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain 
from weapons development. 
4. The debate concerning the size of future arsenals of the various nuclear 
powers produced mixed results. 
5. The tone of predictive studies was not always consistent with 
contemporaneous events. 
6. There is evidence that over the long-term, external assistance was a major 
factor in proliferation.11   
                                                
8 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 86. 
9 Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear 
Weapons,” Brookings Institution (2009): p. 4. 
10 Ibid., p. 4.   
11 Ibid., p. 4-5.  
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This study agrees with the above analysis and will focus, not on predicting how 
many states will pursue nuclear weapons in the future, but rather to what degree the 
international system plays in a state’s nuclear calculus.  For my purposes, lessons 3, 5, 
and 6 a particularly useful.  Alarmism has not gone away, and is seen in many recent 
articles claiming that a nuclear cascade is imminent in the Middle East.  
Furthermore, the main focus of my analysis is consistent with lesson 5. The 
contemporaneous events of the emerging international system must be considered when 
assessing the drivers of nuclear proliferation.  It is not sufficient to simply examine the 
shifting balance of power, which will be addressed in the following chapter establishing 
the theoretical framework of this study.  Lastly, lesson 6 is also important.  External 
assistance is likely to be affected by the multipolar system of the near future, which will 
in turn make it more difficult for states to pursue nuclear weapons.   
Like Sagan and Yusuf, Sonali Singh, and Christopher R. Way, have similar 
reservations of many forecasts.  “Many studies,” they argue, “implicitly rely on 
monocausal logics of inference, comparing competing explanations, as if looking for the 
‘magic bullet’ that will account for all proliferation.”12  Singh and Way bring up an 
important point: no single variable exists that determines whether or not a state will 
proliferate.   Further, Sing and Way explain another problem with many forecasts.  Many 
forecasts determine proliferation in an all-or-nothing fashion where possession of a 
weapon is the only affirmative case of proliferation.13  Instead, the authors argue, 
                                                
12 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A 
Quantitative Test,”  The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, no. 6 (2004): p. 861.   
13 Ibid.   
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proliferation should be viewed as a continuum with four stages: no noticeable interest in 
nuclear weapons, serious exploration of the weapons option, launch of a weapons 
program, and acquisition of nuclear weapons.14  For my purposes, proliferation will refer 
to the testing of a nuclear bomb.  As we have seen in the past, some states that have 
pursued nuclear weapons, or had the political will to pursue nuclear weapons, were either 
unable to do so or changed course.  I have chosen to use the test of a weapon as the 
dependent variable, because the international system can and will intervene in different 
ways with regard to the several variables it takes to build a nuclear weapon.  
Furthermore, it is possible for states to construct a bomb, or attain a latent capability, that 
cannot be detected.  Therefore, it is not possible to use the construction of a bomb as the 
dependent variable.  Since I have included capacity as one of my independent variables, 
the international system could still intervene in important ways preventing a state from 
attaining nuclear weapons.  
 
Methodology 
What makes this study different is its focus on the how the changing international 
system will affect nuclear aspirations and capabilities while taking a multi-causal 
approach.  I examine a variety of variables in order to determine to what extent the 
emerging multipolar system will influence calculations concerning nuclear weapons in 
the future.  In the next chapter, I will examine which parts of the global system are 
changing, how those factors might shape states’ nuclear calculations, as well as those 
                                                
14 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 
861. 
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factors that may not be affected by the international system.  Next, I examine the various 
theories with regard to nuclear proliferation and put them in context with the changing 
international system.  Finally, I test this theory with two case studies: Iran and Turkey.  
 
Variables 
 Through an examination of the literature concerning nuclear weapons 
proliferation, I have constructed three causal diagrams to account for the theories; I will 
examine the theories in the next chapter.  Two main variables exist: willingness and 
capacity.  Each of these main variables is driven by a variety of sub-variables.  Below I 
will go into detail of the sub-variables that I will be using for this study.  First, however, 
willingness and capacity should be further explained.  Capacity and willingness 
essentially correspond to the supply and demand sides of proliferation decisions.  Both 
must be looked at with equal importance.   
 Willingness refers to whether or not a state wants to pursue nuclear weapons.  In 
the past, this variable was boiled down to the most simplistic examination of security 
concerns, but, as history has demonstrated, the theory has evolved to include a variety of 
other factors that go far beyond security concerns.  The causal diagram below 
demonstrates the main variables I will be using to determine willingness of a state to 
pursue nuclear weapons.   The willingness variable is further broken down into ideational 
and material factors.   
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Figure 1 
The ideational factors are as indicated in the diagram above: identity, norms, and 
prestige.  The material factors are a combination of economic and security interests, as 
well as a state’s capacity to pursue nuclear weapons (to be discussed below).  
 Even though, as I argued above, many analysts have focused too heavily on 
security interests as a driver of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it still plays an 
important role.  Nuclear weapons can mitigate security concerns through their deterrent 
capabilities. Another important aspect of the security environment of a state is the 
security assurances it may receive from other states.   If a state lies under the nuclear 
umbrella of another state, like the United States, it may be less likely to obtain its own 
nuclear deterrent.   Instead, a state may be more likely to choose to focus its time and 
energy on other concerns, like developing the domestic economy.   
 This brings me to my next variable: economic interests, a variable that will play a 
larger role in the emerging international system as globalization increases and states 
become more integrated economically.  More specifically, it is important to analyze a 
country’s preferred method of economic development.  An outward looking state, one 
that seeks economic opportunities outside of its own borders will be less likely to pursue 
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nuclear weapons.   On the other hand, an inward looking state, one that focuses its 
economy inside its own borders, does not rely on the economic partnerships and is more 
at risk to pursue nuclear weapons.   This leads me to the other variable regarding 
economic interests: the vulnerability of a state to external economic pressure.  One of the 
most common ways the international community attempts to deal with a state it believes 
is pursuing nuclear weapons is through the placement of sanctions.  Weak states cannot 
stand up to sanctions like stronger states can.  It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that simply because a state is vulnerable to external economic pressure, does not mean 
that it will cease to pursue nuclear weapons.  Further, states with outward looking models 
of economic development rely on relationships with other states.  If these relationships 
were to be severed, the states vital economic interests would be at risk, and states may 
find that it is not worth losing its economic interests by seeking nuclear weapons.  Some 
states may conclude, either due to security threats or ideology, that nuclear weapons are 
worth the expense.   
 In addition to security concerns and economic interests, ideational factors must 
also be taken into account.  This is a particularly difficult driver to explain due to the 
large number of ideational factors that can be at play in different countries.  Thus, I have 
broken down ideational factors into a few basic components: norms, identities, and 
prestige.  Norms are playing a more and more important role in proliferation calculations 
due to the ever-growing number of treaties, agreements, and movements that seek to 
protect the world from growing nuclear stockpiles.  It is possible that states will choose 
not to pursue nuclear weapons because of the belief that doing so would be harmful for 
the world.  A state’s adherence to norms can be difficult to determine, because, as we 
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have seen in the past, signatories of the NPT often pursue nuclear weapons covertly.  
Thus, it is also important to look at other indicators like treaties concerning chemical or 
biological weapons or testing or public statements by state leadership.   Also, breaking 
norms could result in a loss of prestige, or political and economic backlash leading to 
isolation in the international community.  
 Identities of a state also play an important role in assessing the risk of a state 
pursuing nuclear weapons.  In this case, identity can refer to a lot of things.  But most 
importantly, it refers to whether a state’s ethical and moral traditions allow for nuclear 
weapons production.   Religion can play a large role, as many religious principals, both 
Eastern and Western, condemn not only the use of nuclear weapons, but the production of 
them as well.  In other states, leaders may simply be ideologically opposed to the idea of 
nuclear weapons.   Still, in other states, the personality of the state’s leadership is 
important in determining proliferation.  This will be explained in detail in the theory 
section.   
 Finally, prestige is an important factor to consider when calculating a state’s 
motivation to pursue nuclear weapons.  In many cases, a state may feel that the only way 
to get the prestige it feels it deserves is through the production of nuclear weapons.  
Prestige can come in a few different forms.  First, a state may feel that simply the 
possession of nuclear weapons will persuade the international community to take it more 
seriously.  Also, a state may find prestige in the scientific and technological achievements 
that come with nuclear weapons.   Conversely, states can choose not to pursue nuclear 
weapons because of prestige.  In this regard, prestige can be closely related to norms and 
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identity.  In order to examine whether or not prestige is at play in a given state, I will look 
at the strategic culture of states as well as public statements by their leadership.   
 In addition to examining the willingness of states to pursue nuclear weapons, we 
must also consider a state’s capacity to do so—the final material variable.  Capacity is the 
last material variable examined in this study.  Even if a state were to be fully committed 
to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, it will not pursue nuclear weapons if it lacks the 
ability to do so.  I have broken capacity down into four different variables: access to 
materials, economic capacity, know-how, and technical capacity/technology.   
 
Figure 2 
 Access to materials is incredibly important to any budding nuclear weapons 
program.  The transfer and sale of uranium is highly regulated, and can only be mined in 
a relatively small number of countries.  If a country is not able to obtain uranium, even if 
it mastered the ability to enrich it to weaponization levels, it would not be able create the 
fissile material needed for a weapons program.   
 Economic capacity is also an important factor determining whether or not a state 
will pursue nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons programs are expensive, and few 
countries can afford one.  Some countries divert funds to nuclear weapons programs at 
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the expense of the well being of their population; simply because a state has limited funds 
does not mean that it will not go to great lengths to pay for nuclear weapons programs.   
 Know-how is also an important variable in capacity to produce nuclear weapons.  
It takes special knowledge and highly educated engineers to not only enrich uranium, but 
also to turn HEU into workable and efficient bombs.  Furthermore, a country also needs 
to produce delivery methods, which in most cases is missiles.  Many countries lack a base 
of scientists and engineers capable of producing a robust nuclear weapons program.  It 
should be noted, however, that know-how is becoming easier to come by.  Not only is 
know-how bought and sold on the black market, much of the knowledge with regard to 
building bombs is becoming more and more accessible, which makes this driver one of 
the easier capacity hurdles to overcome.  As I will demonstrate below, however, this kind 
of knowledge is not enough to create nuclear weapons.  A much more specialized 
knowledge is required that is not necessarily more widely available because of 
globalization.    
 It is only when both willingness and capacity align will a state pursue nuclear 
weapons.   As demonstrated in each of the causal diagrams above, many variables exist 
which will affect a state’s willingness and capacity to pursue nuclear weapons.    
 
 
Figure 3 
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Case Studies 
The idea of a nuclear cascade in the Middle East, given the continued pursuit of 
nuclear weapons by Iran, has grown so popular, that many simply take it as fact.  Such a 
focus on this idea, and how it could happen, has distracted analysts from more realistic 
understandings of the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by focusing too 
heavily on narrow-minded analyses based solely on realist interpretations of the security 
environment.  When one examines the security environment more closely, however, 
along with the characteristics of the state’s leadership, the political economy, as well as 
the technological and economic capacity, the prospect of a nuclear cascade in the Middle 
East no longer seems inevitable.  In fact, even if a state should choose to pursue nuclear 
weapons, the international community has at its disposal a variety of levers for 
intervention.  The immense amount of resources and time it takes to develop a nuclear 
weapons program allows the international community plenty of opportunity to keep a 
state from proliferating should it choose that path.  To examine this hypothesis, I will 
focus on Turkey and Iran—two states believed by many to be at high risk of proliferation, 
especially if Iran continues to pursue the bomb.  I will demonstrate using the above four 
drivers that both Iran and Turkey may have a larger incentive not to pursue nuclear 
weapons.   
Turkey 
Some may see Turkey as an interesting choice in testing my hypothesis, but my 
choice to include Turkey was made after careful examination.  Many analysts claim that 
Turkey is at high risk of proliferation because of a combination of variables.  First, many 
analysts claim that Turkey will not tolerate a nuclear armed Iran, and will pursue its own 
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nuclear capability should Turkish leaders perceive that Tehran maintain its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.  Second, many analysts (correctly) observe that Turkey’s relationship 
with NATO is deteriorating quickly.  This viewpoint, though shared by many, is 
characterized by Peter Brookes who claims that Ankara is already considering its nuclear 
options.15 
Iran  
I have chosen to use Iran as my first case study because it demonstrates the most 
difficult test of my hypothesis, especially since it has gone to great lengths to defy the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to its enrichment projects, but 
some clarification is necessary.  First, it should be noted that Iran began its “modest 
nuclear programme” in the 1960s under rule of the Shah. At this time, explains Emanuele 
Ottolenghi, author of Iran: The Looming Crisis, prestige was a strong motivating factor 
for nuclear research and nuclear weapons proliferation.16  Iran’s current efforts to enrich 
uranium must be understood in this context, for enrichment began far before the 
multipolar system began to emerge.   
                                                
15 Peter Brookes, “Post Iran Proliferation Cascade,” The Journal of International Security 
Affairs 19 (2010): p. 11.   
16 Emanuele Ottolenghi, Iran: The Looming Crisis (New York: Profile Books, 2009): pp. 
22-23.   
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CHAPTER 2 THEORY 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the National Intelligence Council is predicting, 
“Over the next 15-20 years, reactions to the decisions Iran makes about its nuclear 
program could cause a number of regional states to intensify these efforts and consider 
actively pursuing nuclear weapons.”17  The report continues, “…[E]ven an Iranian 
capacity to develop nuclear weapons might prompt regional responses that could be 
destabilizing.”18  The report does not predict, however, that nuclear proliferation is 
inevitable, even in Iran.  Tehran, claims the NIC, may choose to forgo weaponization 
over “technological impediments” or the desire to integrate its economy with that of the 
international system.19  The report glances quickly over this prospect, however, and 
sensationally predicts that the Middle East will become “Potentially More Dangerous 
than the Cold War,”20 despite the fact that the NIC lists an arms race in the Middle East 
as one of its Key Uncertainties.21   
                                                
17 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. 61. 
18 Ibid., p. 62. 
19 Ibid., p. 61. 
20 Ibid., p. 62. 
21 Ibid., p. v. 
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Why would the NIC predict such a pessimistic fate for the Middle East despite all 
that is known about the inaccuracies of nuclear weapons forecasts as demonstrated in the 
introduction of this study?  The answer is simple.  Despite hedging that a multi-state arms 
race in the Middle East is not inevitable, they fall victim to traditional realist theories that 
have been proven incomplete.  The NIC report focuses particularly on the Middle East, 
but analysts have been predicting that other states are at risk of proliferation as well, for 
example Japan, South Korea, and even Brazil just to name a few.  The goal of this thesis 
is not specifically to counter the claims of the NIC in Global Trends 2025, but rather to 
explore the actual effects of the changes of the international system on nuclear weapons 
proliferation around the world.  This chapter will examine the historic assumptions of 
changes in the international system (particularly multipolar systems) followed by 
predictions of the emerging multipolar international system.  
 
Neo Realist Assumptions 
The NIC report mentioned above demonstrates, “Historically, emerging 
multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones,”22  a 
traditional neorealist expectation as explained by Jack Donnelly.23  Hans Morgenthau, 
one of the founders of contemporary realism, best explains this assumption and explains 
that multipolar systems increase uncertainty, and thus increase caution.24  Also, in 
                                                
22 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. vi. 
23 Jack Donnelly, "Realism." in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scot Burchill and 
Andrew Linklater (New York: Pelgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 40. 
24 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1973), p. 121.  
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multipolar systems, Morgenthau claims, even small states can make a big impact.25  This 
is likely to be the case in the emerging system, as we already see smaller states like 
Pakistan or Yemen playing a major role in international security, even if in a different 
capacity than Morgenthau would have assessed.  In a system in which states cannot rely 
on allies, it is easy to understand why smaller states vulnerable to another state’s nuclear 
arsenal will attempt to close a security gap with a nuclear arsenal of their own.  
More recently, John Mearsheimer has emphasized the uncertainty and dangers of 
multipolar systems complementing the work of Morgenthau demonstrated above. 
Mearsheimer bluntly proclaims, “War is more likely in multipolarity than bipolarity….”26 
He lists three reasons why, which deserve listing here.  First, Mearsheimer argues, “There 
are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a 
multipolar system.”27  This is one reason many analysts believe that states will choose 
nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security in an environment where war is more 
likely.  Second, Mearsheimer argues, “Imbalances of power are more commonplace in a 
multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a 
war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely.28  Again, in such an 
environment, states should have an incentive to pursue nuclear weapons in order to 
balance against these great powers, which are now more likely to wage war.  Finally, 
                                                
25 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 121.  
26 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2001), p. 338. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid., p. 338. 
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Mearsheimer’s third argument explains, “The potential for miscalculations is greater in 
multipolarity: States might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another 
state when, in fact, they do not.”29  Again, this argument emphasizes the unpredictability 
of the multipolar systems.   
The above-assumed characteristics of multipolar systems have led many nuclear 
forecasters to predict widespread proliferation.  In fact, Mearsheimer made this claim 
himself in a famously contested article, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after 
the Cold War.”  In predicting a multipolar Europe after the end of the Cold War, 
Mearsheimer infamously predicts that nuclear weapons will also spread across the 
continent, particularly to Germany and the “minor powers of Eastern Europe.” 30  
An interesting note with regard to uncertainty is that risk also becomes more 
uncertain, and thus, states take as little risk as possible.31  Scott Sagan similarly argues 
that balance of power politics and the security dilemma actually deters proliferation in 
many cases, thus making the world safer.  “Restrained policies that appear to some 
scholars to be the result of ethical considerations,” Sagan argues, “are often actually the 
calculated pursuit of long-term national security interests.”  He continues, “This is the 
case when the nonuse of such weapons is due to a fear that an adversary would take your 
military action as a precedent or excuse to do something that you do not want to see 
                                                
29 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 338. 
30 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): p. 36. 
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happen in the future.”32   This means that, for example, if Turkey attempts to counter the 
nuclear aspirations of Iran, it could push Iran over the proverbial tipping point in order to 
balance the intentions of Turkey.  Thus, Turkey has only created the very undesirable 
outcome it was looking to avoid in the first place.    
Avoidance of risk, however, does not determine whether a state will pursue 
nuclear weapons or not.  A state could be attempting to avoid risk of becoming 
vulnerable to a state with nuclear weapons.  On the other hand, proliferation can be risky 
in itself.  States can be subject to harsh sanctions, isolation from the international 
community, and even military intervention.  For some states, they are already isolated, 
and are not in a position in which sanctions are particularly harmful (or they do not care 
about sanctions for one reason or another).  Thus, uncertainty is not decisive in tipping a 
state one way or the other, but can instead help the analyst determine which would be 
more risky for a particular state.   
With regard to nuclear weapons, Kenneth Waltz has spent much time and effort 
exploring the characteristics of polarity in the international system, and two of his ideas 
are particularly important to examine in this study, as they echo the arguments of 
Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, which predict that nuclear weapons proliferation will 
increase in the multipolar future.  The first is that states cannot be certain of other states’ 
actions.33  Also, states’ relative capabilities will change in unforeseen ways in the 
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future.34  Thus, states are “unwilling to make any move that results in any deterioration of 
their existing position,”35 and  states will most likely conclude that nuclear weapons will 
mitigate the uncertainty and vulnerability experienced under multipolarity and maintain 
their positions within the system.   
Indeed, the theory seems to demonstrate that multipolarity will lead to a less 
predictable and less stable security environment for a variety of states, even if states 
calculate they are better off not making efforts to close capability gaps as explained by 
Sagan or receive security assurances from more powerful states.  Just as Mearsheimer got 
it wrong in 1988, analysts predicting nuclear cascade have gotten it wrong this time by 
examining the theory in a vacuum and not considering other aspects of the emerging 
system.  According to the literature to be reviewed below, some aspects will stay the 
same, such as international organizations, international agreements, and norms.  Indeed, 
no enforcement mechanism is strong enough to keep states from proliferating, as we have 
seen before, but the factors just mentioned will still play a strong role, as will security 
assurances.  Furthermore, the NIC has gotten it wrong by extrapolating significant shifts 
in economic balance of power to the military realm.  
Security assurances can mitigate uncertainty.  As Morgenthau explains, states will 
continue to prefer to work with allies, but that states cannot be certain allies will stay “on 
side.”36   Many observers are predicting an end of a few security assurances that have 
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traditionally kept states under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, particularly with 
regard to Turkey.  This will be elaborated upon below.   
Richard Haass explains how the emerging system will reflect this theory, 
“[N]onpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a 
country….”37  Haass claims that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a result of this.  He 
explains:  
Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another 
meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many 
sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. 
And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, 
Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or 
block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets 
nonpolarity.38 
With the exception of Haass, the claims by the theorists examined above that 
dominate the field were formed before anyone could decide, or even hope to foresee, 
what the future international system will look like.  Unlike Waltz and Mearsheimer (at 
the time), and especially Morgenthau, we now have a clearer picture of the emerging 
international system.  
 
The Emerging System Will Defy Realist Assumptions 
Analysts hoping to predict the extent of future nuclear weapons acquisition should 
not rely too heavily on the above assumptions as too many have already done.  To clarify, 
it is not my intention to refute the above realist claims.  Rather, I intend to demonstrate 
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that the above claims are not sufficient in explaining nuclear weapons decisions under the 
characteristics of the emerging intentional system, which includes the addition of other 
material factors (economic concerns and capacity) as well as ideational factors.  As Jack 
Donnelly explains, the expectations of structural realism are not determinant factors, 
merely exogenous pressures that push states in one way or another.39 Additionally, 
sometimes, or perhaps always, other forces are more important.40  Kenneth Waltz has 
even made this argument himself.  He explains:  
A neorealist theory of international politics explains how external forces shape 
states’ behavior, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces.  Under most 
circumstances, a theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be 
made sufficient, for the explanation of foreign policy.  An international political 
theory can explain states’ behavior only when external pressures dominate the 
internal disposition of states, which seldom happens.  When they do not, a theory 
of international politics needs help.41    
The question remains, the question this paper will answer, “do these exogenous 
factors outweigh the endogenous factors?” Furthermore, “are there additional external 
factors in addition to shifting balances of power?”  Therefore, the following review of 
literature will examine the characteristics of the emerging system and determine what 
forces are at play while also addressing main themes of emerging theories of nuclear 
weapons proliferation.    
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Characteristics of The Emerging Multipolar System 
The world is moving away from the multipolar system that emerged after the end 
of the Cold War, this much is clear.  What is not clear, however, is what kind of system is 
emerging.  Commentators agree that the emerging international system differs from 
previous multipolar systems, but not all agree that the future will indeed be multipolar.  
Some analysts predict various systems such as an interpolar system, and even a nonpolar 
system.  Even among analysts that are arguing that the emerging system is multipolar, 
they do not necessarily agree on the characteristics of the emerging system.  I do not 
expect to definitively settle the issue of what the emerging system will look like; 
however, as I will demonstrate, each of these hypotheses has common characteristics that 
inform whether or not states will wish to seek nuclear weapons under the emerging 
international system.  The following section will outline a few different theories and 
hypotheses.  Some major themes of the emerging international system include: stability, 
economic interdependence, and a reliance on ethics and norms.  I will examine the 
emerging system in terms of the variables I explained in the introduction.   
 
Security Environment 
As explained above, realists would assume that the changing security 
environment of the emerging system will lead to an increase in proliferation.  The 
security environment of a state remains an important variable to address, even in the 
emerging international system.  As Scott Sagan explains, “…[S]tates build nuclear 
weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear 
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threats.”42   Likewise, Joseph Cirincione argues “The national security model remains the 
leading explanation for nuclear proliferation and is based in the long-standing 
international relations theory of realism.”43  Thus, Cirincione concludes,  
Nuclear weapons, from this perspective, are the ultimate security guarantor…. 
When a state faces an acute threat to its security such as a potential adversary 
developing nuclear weapons, then that state will almost certainly have to match 
that capability or risk its very existence.44  
Security assurances, on the other hand, work as a motivating force against nuclear 
weapons proliferation.  South Korea is a good example of this.  Because of a strong 
security assurance from the United States, it has not, thus far, pursued a nuclear deterrent 
capability of its own.  The logic is simple.  States pursue nuclear weapons programs in 
order to balance against threats presented by other states.  But, if a state facing threats can 
receive an assurance from a state strong enough to balance against such a threat, states 
can, and will, choose this option instead.  Negative security assurances, as Scott Sagan 
explains, are not effective in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.  He argues that they 
might “be helpful in the short-run, but will likely not be effective in the long-term given 
the inherent suspicions of potential rivals produced by the anarchic international 
system.”45 
Even though the security model is relied upon too heavily, it is vital to examine in 
any analysis of nuclear proliferation.  The global security environment, however, is not 
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changing in the way that the casual claims of many observers indicate.  Thus, I will 
examine the security environments of Iran, and particularly Turkey, in terms of the 
emerging global system.  The security environment of the emerging system, however, 
will not revert back to the anarchic uncertainty that realist theory predicts.  
Perceptions of power and security will change in the emerging system.  Giovanni 
Grevi argues that the emerging system should focus more on the evolution of the 
relationships of the states and actors within the system.46  He continues, “[P]ower cannot 
only be measured relative to that of others, but should also be assessed relative to the 
changing level playing field of international relations and to the prevailing perceptions 
and expectations therein.”47    
The first important characteristic of the emerging international system is that it 
will be more stable than traditionally assessed.  Ariel Ilan Roth explains that one of the 
basic assumptions of the causes of instability of multipolar systems is inaccurate.  Roth 
argues that buckpassing, contrary to popular belief, does not foster instability in a 
multipolar international system.  He claims: 
 [T]he long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic 
stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an 
incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, 
with new tests run and new conclusions explored.48   
                                                
46 Giovanni Grevi, "The Interpolar World: A New Scenario." Occasional Paper, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies (2009), p. 22. 
47 Ibid., p. 23-24.  
48 Ariel Ilan Roth, "Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory," International Studies 
Review, no. 9 (2007): p. 369. 
   
    27   
Buckpassing, Roth explains, occurs in multipolar systems because states may 
constitute a threat to multiple other states.  Thus, a state may be tempted to externalize its 
security costs by passing the costs on to a third state in hopes that the third state’s efforts 
to balance against a potential aggressor will be sufficient to secure itself.49  Thus, 
conventional wisdom, as Roth indicates, has demonstrated that strong incentives to 
buckpass create instability in multipolar systems; however, the notion of buckpassing is 
rooted in a faulty understanding of British behavior before World War II.  He explains 
that a closer examination of the empirical evidence “shows that rather than externalizing 
defense efforts, the relevant state incurred significant expense and made strenuous efforts 
to balance the power of its putative rival.”50  
 Roth demonstrates that one of the key premises upon which the assumption that 
multipolar systems are less stable than bipolar systems depends is a falsified premise but 
falls short of claiming that multipolar systems are not less stable than bipolar or unipolar 
systems.51 Roth explains that these fears are based on faulty assumptions, and that these 
fears have become assumptions of multipolar systems.  Thus, the fears that the emerging 
multipolar system will be unstable are not entirely founded.  
Likewise, Randall L. Schweller further demonstrates how the emerging 
multipolar system may not be unstable as previously believed by utilizing the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics and entropy as a theoretical framework.  System processes as 
opposed to system structures, argues Schweller, best explain international process.  “And 
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this process,” he continues, “is one of entropy.”52  Entropy, Schweller explains, is closely 
related with “disorder and chaos because random configurations have a higher probability 
of occurring more than more ordered ones.”53   With high levels of entropy, a system 
cannot return to its previous energy state.54  He explains:  
[M]aximum entropy (final equilibrium) will be reached when power capabilities 
diffuse to other actors and none has any incentive to move from this condition; 
that is, when there is equal energy among the primary units of the system (the 
poles). At this point, the system will have reached a very unique form of 
multipolarity—one that has never been seen before but whose arrival has been 
predicted since the early 18th century.55 
Haass also addresses the entropy that will occur in the nonpolar, or multipolar, 
system, “[L]eft to its own devices, a nonpolar world will become messier over time.”  He 
continues, “Entropy dictates that systems consisting of a large number of actors tend 
toward greater randomness and disorder in the absence of external intervention.”56  The 
important aspect with regard to entropy is Schweller’s assessment that states will not 
have an incentive to move from the conditions once maximum entropy is reached.  This 
means that, once maximum entropy is reached, states that do not have nuclear weapons 
will not pursue them, which would disrupt the order of the system.   
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Economic Interests 
The balance of power in the emerging system is not shifting only between nation 
states, but also non-state actors.  Haass explains that the emerging system will have a 
diffuse balance of power among a variety of state and non-state actors.  He explains:  
States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; 
from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOSs) and corporations.  Power is now found in many hands and 
in many places…. Today’s world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than 
concentrated power.57 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the emerging international system will be 
characterized by economics shifts, not shifts in military power.  In addition to this diffuse 
base of power, Haass also emphasizes the importance of regional actors in addition to the 
6 major world powers (which he labels as China, the European Union, India, Japan, 
Russia, and the United States). Some of these regional powers, such as Israel and 
Pakistan are currently nuclear weapons states.  Others, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and South Korea are believed to be among those at highest risk to pursue nuclear 
weapons.  Even with these emerging powers—both globally and regionally—the United 
States will remain the world’s foremost superpower by far with regards to military power 
well into the future. 
Grevi explains that understanding the relationship between states, particularly 
with regard to economics, is crucial in understanding all aspects of the future 
international system.  He explains,  
Today, the international system is marked by deepening, existential 
interdependence. Interdependence is existential when its mismanagement can 
threaten not only the prosperity but the political stability and ultimately, in 
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extreme cases, the very survival of the actors that belong to the system. Under this 
unprecedented condition, the ability to shape multilateral cooperation or lead 
collective action in addressing international challenges becomes a central feature 
of power.58 
One of the more notable observations by Grevi is his interpretation of how the 
balance is shifting.  Traditionally, observers and theorists interpret any shift of power or 
balance as a unitary quantity encompassing all aspects of state power like economics, the 
military, and prestige.  Grevi explains that the shift is primarily economic power, not 
military power.59  “The broader political point,” explains Grevi, “is of course that a world 
where three of the five largest economies will be Asian (China, Japan, and India) will be 
a very different place.”60  This is a key observation.  Traditionally, structural realist 
thinking places the emphasis primarily on the military balance, and how states balance 
with regard to military threats.  Grevi, however, emphasizes that economics will be the 
primary driver of balance shifts in the emerging international system.  Economic power 
struggles are markedly different than military power struggles, and this should be taken 
into account when thinking about the emerging multipolar systems.  What is good for a 
state pursuing economic security is not the same as what is good for a state pursuing 
conventional security.  Although, China, India, and Japan are not only economic rivals, 
they are also security rivals.  India and China already have nuclear weapons, but what 
about Japan?  Could they change course and seek nuclear weapons in order to gain 
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security in an age where resources and economic interests may need to be secured from 
economic and security rivals (read: China)?   
Haass also highlights the importance economics plays in the emerging 
international system.  Not only is the American GDP increasing, that of other states is 
increasing.  Haass explains further:  
GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U.S. economic 
dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds -- in countries such as China, 
Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- is another. These 
government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports, 
now total some $3 trillion.61 
Additionally, globalization is a leading cause of change in the international 
system and the interconnectedness that characterizes it.  Haass argues:  
Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-
border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their 
knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. 
Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such 
as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to 
transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the 
international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system 
to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and 
Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments).62 
It is important to note that, while also constraining states, interconnectedness and 
globalization also empowers states in ways that were not possible under the bipolar or 
unipolar systems of the last century.  Haass concludes, “It is easier than ever before for 
individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power.”63   
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Fareed Zakaria also emphasizes the rise of non-state actors.  “Groups and 
individuals have been empowered,” explains Zakaria, “and hierarchy, centralization, and 
control are being undermined.”  He continues, “Functions that were once controlled by 
governments are now shared with international bodies like the World Trade Organization 
and the European Union.”64   
One of the most important aspects that is overlooked when speaking of the 
emerging international system is that the United States will still remain as the 
world’s strongest power, especially in terms of military strength.  While it is true 
that the relative power and influence of the United States is declining, and in turn 
that of the rest of the world is increasing, analysts casually including the changing 
international system within their reports grossly over estimate the degree of 
relative power shifts.   
Like the authors discussed above, he also claims that the shift away from 
unipolarity is based mostly on economic strength, not military strength.  These shifts, 
claims Zakaria, are occurring in every other realm as well, except militarily.65  Like the 
other authors, Zakaria also recognizes that the United States will remain the most 
powerful and most influential player.  Zakaria suggests, that instead of multipolarity, the 
emerging system more closely resembles Samuel Huntington’s “uni-multipolarity,” or 
what Chinese politicians refer to as “many powers, and one superpower.”66  “The messy 
language,” explains Zakaria, “reflects the messy reality.”67  Zakaria claims, “We are now 
living through the third great power shift of the modern era,” an era he refers to as, “the 
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rise of the rest.”68  “Over the past few decades,” he continues, “countries all over the 
world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable.”69  
This robust economic growth, Zakaria claims, “is creating an international system in 
which countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in 
their own right.”70 
Grevi addresses military and political constraint and empowerment to be 
experienced by actors throughout the globe.  Grevi argues, “[T]he deterrent function of 
military power (notably when used asymmetrically) is acquiring increasing political 
relevance.”71  He continues, “In short, from a political-strategic standpoint, it can be 
argued that military power is increasingly a form of negative power, or power of 
denial.”72  This concept is particularly important in terms of nuclear proliferation, as the 
power of denial is one of the main external factors at play.  We have seen this many times 
over from both the United States and Israel.  The United States went to war in Iraq over 
the auspices of an Iraqi nuclear program.  This is the most extreme example.  Israel has 
also bombed nuclear sites in Iraq as well as in Syria.  Finally, the Stuxnet virus that 
sabotaged Iranian centrifuges is another form of states trying to deny nuclear weapons to 
other states.  This also plays a large role in resource scarcity, which may cause increased 
conflict.  Grevi also explains, however, that the outreach of states other than the US or 
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those in the EU is constraining western political influence.73  Grevi concludes this 
discussion by arguing that negative power contains some short-term benefits, but 
ultimately more risky long-term effects.74   
But it is important that Grevi explains that this won’t happen naturally—it is 
going to take serious effort on all parts of the international system to reconcile its 
inevitable differences, especially with regard to resource scarcity and energy.  
Furthermore, Grevi explains the importance of addressing the threat of the spread of 
nuclear weapons as an issue on which the international community will need to 
cooperate.75 
Haass adds to this sentiment by explaining that alliances and partnerships will 
“lose much of their importance.”76  Whereas these two authors don’t specifically claim 
that the international community will be pressured into forming partnerships and 
multilateral institutions, both emphasize that the unpredictability and serious issues that 
need to be addressed give serious incentives for the international community to 
cooperate.  Haass concludes: 
…[E]ncouraging a greater degree of global integration will help promote stability. 
Establishing a core group of governments and others committed to cooperative 
multilateralism would be a great step forward. Call it "concerted nonpolarity." It 
would not eliminate nonpolarity, but it would help manage it and increase the 
odds that the international system will not deteriorate or disintegrate.77 
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As Etel Solingen explains that the political economy of a state is a large indicator 
of its nuclear decisions: 
Inward-looking models [of economic development] approximate necessary if not 
sufficient conditions for nuclear weapons programs. Internationalizing models are 
not necessary but likely to be sufficient for denuclearization except under two 
circumstances: (a) when neighboring inward-looking regimes seek nuclear 
weapons (or other WMD); and (b) when nuclear weapons were acquired prior to 
the inception of internationalizing models.78 
Thus, the decision to nuclearize, based on Solingen’s conceptual framework, is a 
calculation based on the political survival of the ruling regime.  Stephen F. Burgess 
demonstrates how this model pertains to the Libyan rollback from nuclear weapons.  
Qaddafi, explains Burgess, was fearing a growing movement challenging his power in the 
country, and rolled back the nuclear weapons program in order to win over the “hearts 
and minds” of the Libyan people, which could not be done while pursuing nuclear 
weapons.79   As we see citizens of several countries throughout the Middle East rise up in 
opposition of oppressive leadership, is it possible that leadership in other states will come 
to the same conclusion, perhaps Syria or even Iran?   
 T.V. Paul argues, at least in some cases, economic interdependence decreases a 
state’s desire to pursue nuclear weapons.  He further argues, “The economic 
interdependence of today is different from any in previous eras in terms of institutions, 
scale, and depth.”80  He argues with regard to Germany, “Unilateral nuclear armament 
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would run counter to German interest in integrating with [European] economies and 
playing a larger role in these countries.  With the end of the Cold War, Germany’s 
security interdependence with other European states has increased, making it more 
difficult for it to acquire an independent nuclear capability.”81  Although Germany is an 
extreme case, this logic applies to other states as well.  States are less likely to have 
conflict or go to war with states if they are closely linked economically.82   If a state in a 
close economic relationship with other states were to choose to pursue nuclear weapons, 
its economic interests would surely suffer as its economic partners attempt to dissuade it 
from its decisions.  As the theories demonstrated above, incentives for states to form 
economic partnerships are increasing dramatically; thus we should see a reduction in 
motivation to pursue nuclear weapons.   
 
Ideational Factors 
Another way the emerging multipolar system differs from previous assessments 
of multipolar systems is that ideas, norms, and identities play a larger role.  For example, 
Schweller claims, “[T]he social structure (or social purpose) of a given unipolar system, 
not its material structure, determines the kind of politics that take place within the system 
and the constraints exerted on the actors” (emphasis added).83   Schweller argues that, had 
the Soviet Union won the Cold War, “Its unipolar system would likely have been 
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dominated by brute force and coercion.”84  Schweller argues, states in the current 
international system no longer have an incentive to aggressively expand, nor do other 
states in the system fear this is so.  And, without these expectations of conquest, the 
complexity and uncertainty of the multipolar system should not cause instability.85 
Schweller argues that this leads to a lack of constraints in the international system, not 
continued restraint by the United States.86  Schweller, however, wrote before the 
establishment of the preemption doctrine, which has demonstrated that the United States 
is prepared to project its power overseas.  Some states may see the preemption doctrine as 
a sign that they need to take precautions against becoming the next target of a state 
seeking to increase its own security to prevent preemptive attacks.   
Haass also explains why the “unipolar moment” has ended. States develop; they 
get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial and technological 
resources that lead to productivity and prosperity.87  Thus, this indicates the rise of many 
more actors, and can certainly lead to the decline of the United States.   
Likewise, Martha Finnemore acknowledges that the emerging system will differ 
from previous multipolar systems in that norms and legitimacy characterize the emerging 
system.  She explains, “The U.S.-favored liberal model of free markets and democracy 
became the model of choice for states around the world not through overt U.S. coercion, 
but in significant part because states and publics had accepted it as the best (ergo most 
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legitimate) way to run a country.”88   She continues, “…[T]he structure of world politics, 
however, is social as much as it is material.”89  She explains further, “Social structures of 
norms concerning sovereignty, liberalism, self-determination, and border rigidity (among 
other things) have changed over time and create vastly different political dynamics 
among these systems.”90  As the United States enjoyed hegemony in both the bipolar 
system, and the unipolar system that followed, it set in place certain sets of rules and 
institutions.  Finnemore explains, “To exercise power effectively, unipoles must 
legitimate it and in the act of legitimating their power, uniopoles must diffuse it.”91  
Through the use of norms and legitimate institutions used to further the interest of the 
United States, they became an important part of the new international system.   
In addition to the above assessments of the emerging international system, 
Giovanni Grevi and Richard N. Haass present two alternatives: the interpolar system and 
the nonpolar system, respectively.  Grevi claims that the emerging international system is 
an “unprecedented configuration of international relations,” and defines the interpolar 
system as “multipolarity in an age of interdependence” coupled with the “redistribution 
of power at the global level.”92  Grevi focuses on “what brings major powers together,” 
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as opposed to “what sets them apart.”93  Grevi claims that interdependence and a 
continuation of asymmetric balance of power will constrain states from acting 
unilaterally or independently of others.94  This demonstrates that states will still be 
constrained by certain forces and states in the international system, while simultaneously 
becoming less constrained in other areas.  For my purposes, this demonstrates that, even 
though states like Turkey, Syria, and South Korea are less constrained by the 
international system, the international system is still arranged in a way that constrains 
them from pursuing nuclear weapons due to not only norms and international 
organizations (namely the NPT), but also pressure from other countries (namely the 
United States).  Much research has been conducted on the role that norms play with 
regard to the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons including Scott Sagan, Nina 
Tannenwald, Maria Rublee, and T.V. Paul.   
Sagan demonstrates that prestige, in what he refers to as the Norms Model, 
“focuses on norms concerning weapons acquisition, seeing nuclear decisions as serving 
important symbolic functions—both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.”95   France 
is an excellent example of how prestige can drive proliferation.  De Gaulle believed that 
nuclear weapons would help restore France as a great power—to its rightful position in 
the world.96  In this case, nuclear weapons become more of a political tool rather than a 
military weapon.  The French bomb also illustrates an important point about how the 
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global system can affect nuclear calculations.  De Gaulle chose to pursue his bomb in a 
time when French prestige was at a low point, because only the United States and the 
Soviet Union remained as global superpower after World War II.   In this case, the 
bipolar system was a motivating factor for France to balance the power of the United 
States in order enhance its prestige.   
 Conversely, prestige can drive states to roll back, or forego, proliferation.  
Though, “It took some time for this non-nuclear position to prevail,”97 as Cirincione 
explains, non-proliferation has become a strong norm throughout the international 
community.  Today, 189 states are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
and nuclear weapons free zones exist in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Southeast 
Asia/Pacific, Antarctica, the seabed, and outer space.  States can find prestige in 
leadership positions with regard to nonproliferation movements.98  Further, with regard to 
rollback specifically, Ukraine found non-proliferation norms and abandonment of their 
inherited nuclear arsenal as a way to enhance their international standing, according to 
Sagan.99  In this case, this demonstrates a desire of some states to work more closely with 
the international system, and, as I will demonstrate below, this will likely increase in the 
emerging multipolar system.   
Maria Rublee goes beyond the argument made by Sagan.  She argues, “Though it 
has taken a variety of forms, the rough normative trajectory within the international social 
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environment has been to delegitimize nuclear weapons.”100  Rublee argues that norms of 
nonproliferation are cemented in the formalization of the NPT, and, through this 
formalization, “potential proliferators must face this norm and risk defying it.”101  She 
acknowledges that the formalization of the NPT is not enough to keep states from 
pursuing nuclear weapons, even among signatories to the treaty, but “[W]ithout the NPT, 
the nuclear nonproliferation norm had no official platform from which to be 
activated….The more the nuclear nonproliferation norm is activated, the more likely 
policymakers are to commit to forgoing nuclear weapons.”102  Not only have norms 
stemmed from ethical and moral assessments of nuclear weapons, they have also changed 
the way states think about proliferation by shifting the cost-benefit analysis away from 
simple threat analysis.  Rublee explains, “The NPT created social and material incentives 
for forgoing nuclear weapons as well as making it technically and practically difficult to 
develop a nuclear weapons program.”103  The summary of her argument is as follows: 
…[T]he international social environment, supported by first an emergent and then 
a full-fledged nuclear nonproliferation regime, has helped to provide that systemic 
impetus toward nuclear nonproliferation.  The emerging antinuclear norm led to 
the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which set forth a clear 
inductive norm against nuclear proliferation; and then as states acceded to the 
treaty, the expanding regime established a descriptive norm against nuclear 
proliferation as well.  The negotiations to create the regime, and the regime itself, 
communicated that a nuclear weapons program was a violation of international 
norms, instead of an act of national pride.  In addition, international legitimacy 
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was linked to nuclear nonproliferation; members of the international community 
were expected to comply.104  
 
 Finally, ideational factors also include the psychology of the leadership, based on 
the research of Jacques Hymans.  Hymans explains that proliferation depends on the 
personality of a state’s leadership.  Whereas this model goes beyond domestic politics to 
the individual level of analysis, the leader ultimately makes a decision on the domestic 
political level.  Hyman’s explains, “[L]eaders who hold a ‘national identity conception’ 
of ‘oppositional nationalism’ have a strong emotional tendency to decide to go for an 
actual operational nuclear arsenal.”105  Whereas it is easy to see this principle 
demonstrated using North Korea as an example (Kim Jong Il is nothing if not an 
“oppositional nationalist”), India is a more nuanced example demonstrating how this 
principle plays out in domestic politics.   On the other hand, three other national identity 
conceptions, according to Hymans, will ultimately choose to forgo nuclear weapons.  
These national identity conceptions include: oppositional subaltern, sportsman like 
nationalist, and sportsmanlike subaltern.106  
 Indira Gandhi, and the BJP after the Cold War, is often given credit (or blame) 
with regard to India’s path to the bomb.  Indira Gandhi possessed the characteristics of 
the “oppositional nationalist” and believed that a bomb was needed to keep India secure, 
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especially since China had one.107  After the end of the Cold War, George Perkovich 
claims, “Only the [BJP] has favored the ‘great power’ norm to the exclusion (almost) of 
the moral superiority-through-nuclear-self-restraint norm.”108  Also, those who contend 
the Indian decision to finally complete nuclearization demonstrate that, since the end of 
the Cold War, India did not test a bomb until 1998, almost immediately after the BJP 
came into power.109 Even though security concerns factored into the decisions of Indira 
Gandhi and the BJP, ultimately, it was the personalities of the state leaders that led to the 
decision to nuclearize, and not the security concerns themselves. It should be noted, 
however, that the BJP inherited the latent nuclear capability from its successors.  It is not 
necessary to explain how this theory leads to nonproliferation, as a state (any of the states 
that are not the 10 or so currently possessing or pursuing nuclear weapons) simply lacks 
leaders with the oppositional nationalist identity.   
 According to Nina Tannenwald, nuclear weapons have become taboo, which “has 
constrained the practice of ‘self-help’ in the international system.  States are not free to 
resort to nuclear weapons without incurring moral opprobrium or political costs.”110  
Tannenwald claims that the nuclear taboo has been created by three groups of factors: a 
transnational antinuclear weapons movement, non-nuclear states’ strategic pressures and 
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the risk of escalation, and the moral concerns of individual decision makers.111   
Additionally, many material and normative factors played an important role: the 
difficulty of mastering nuclear technology; rise of humanitarian norms; and the fact that 
the US was the first one to actually use a bomb.  Had the Soviet Union or China been the 
first, she argues, the malevolent leaders who did not have to answer to its population may 
not have restrained themselves.112  Tannenwald argues that the nuclear taboo reaches 
beyond rationality and has become a genuine normative aspect of decision-making.113   
 Each of the driving forces discussed thus far can inform and steer proliferation 
and rollback with regard to domestic politics.  “Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons serves the national interests of a state,” explains Sagan, “it is likely to serve the 
parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the 
state.”114  In some cases, political entities may be most influenced by security concerns, 
and other political entities may be more concerned with normative considerations.  
International norms can constrain state behavior by “shaming” or “pressuring” various 
political actors, according to Jeffrey T. Checkel.115  Checkel believes that norms go 
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beyond simply constraining behavior—they can actually shape actor’s preferences.116   
The domestic politics model may be able to explain Egyptian nuclear restraint.  Even 
though many political forces within Egypt have been calling for a nuclear weapons 
program for some time, Mubarak is the one that actually kept a lid on nuclear ambitions. 
Now that he is no longer in power, some analysts are warning that the new government 
may facilitate the nuclear ambitions of previously suppressed actors.117 
 
Capacity 
 The final material variable is economic and technical capacities.  These variables 
are facilitating factors that allow a state to proliferate, not necessarily a driver in and of 
themselves, but the converse is not necessarily true.  A lack of economic or technological 
capacity can be a driving force of rollbacks.  In other words, if all of the other cards are in 
place driving a state towards nuclearization, it will be forced to roll back if it does not 
possess the adequate technology.  Cirincione argues that economic sanctions hindered 
Iraq’s technological capacity to build nuclear weapons.118  Can sanctions prevent states in 
the future from obtaining the technology necessary to build nuclear weapons?   
On the other hand, economic considerations can be a significant factor in 
explaining rollback from nuclear weapons programs.  Quite frankly, nuclear weapons 
                                                
116 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist—Constructivist Divide,” p. 488.  
117 Joseph Cirincione, “Egypt's Nuclear Dimension,” Huffington Post, February 13, 2011, 
accessed March 13, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/egypts-nuclear-
dimension_b_822588.html. 
118 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare, p. 75. 
   
    46   
programs are expensive—very expensive.   Burgess explains that the cost of the Libyan 
program were so great that it was damaging the Libyan economy and domestic 
stability.119  In this case, economic capability is closely related to the political interests of 
a state.  Further, in addition to the expense of a nuclear weapons program and the 
development of delivery systems, sanctions placed by the international community can 
make the pursuit of nuclear weapons unfeasible.  This was a large factor in Libya’s 
decision to roll back its nuclear program.  Burgess lists sanctions as his first reason Libya 
rolled back its nuclear weapons program.120  On the other hand, sanctions were not 
enough to keep Pakistan from attaining nuclear weapons.    Rublee explains, “Cases such 
as North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran only underscore the point: if a country has the political 
will, not even poverty or underdevelopment can keep it from building a nuclear weapons 
program.”121   
Katherine McCardle Kelleher questions, “can we really restore the genie to its 
bottle, given the global spread of civil nuclear technologies, the near instantaneous 
distribution technical literature, and a global commerce system poised to deliver any and 
all necessary components through a myriad of legal and illegal channels?”122  Steven E. 
Miller and Scott Sagan wrote in 2009 that we are living in a time where an interest in 
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nuclear energy is surging.   Furthermore, a close link exists between the capability to 
produce nuclear energy and in producing nuclear weapons, and they ponder, “Will the 
nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely 
and heavily invested in nuclear power?”123   
Dennis Gormley explains that the knowledge to construct nuclear weapons, which 
he calls explicit knowledge, and related technology, will become more widely available 
thanks to globalization and the Internet.124  From this point of view, one would expect 
proliferation to become more widespread due to the ease of attainment.  However, 
Gormley explains that explicit knowledge is not sufficient to construct a nuclear weapons 
and related technology. Tacit knowledge, the kind of knowledge derived from 
experience, is necessary in order to construct nuclear weapons.  He explains: 
Whereas explicit knowledge consists of information or engineering formulations 
that can be recorded and passed easily from one place to another, tacit knowledge 
cannot be written down or passed via digital media. Rather, it is acquired through 
the laborious and lengthy process of apprenticeship. Tacit knowledge, then, is the 
product of a uniquely fertile social and intellectual environment composed of 
mentors and proteges."  Obtained as it is under these narrowly bounded 
circumstances, tacit knowledge skills are not widely diffused in the way that 
explicit knowledge is.125 
The emerging international system will also have to face the challenge of 
secondary proliferation.  As more states are gaining the ability to enrich uranium, even 
for peaceful purposes, the technology and knowledge (both explicit and tacit) are 
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spreading as well.  We have already seen this with states like North Korea and Pakistan 
giving nuclear assistance to other countries.  The Arms Control Association explains:  
Recent assessments and press reports suggest that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea 
have been able to circumnavigate the multilateral export control regimes in two 
ways: one, by focusing on traditional supplier states for mass-market, dual-use 
equipment and materials, and two, by complementing such acquisitions via a 
parallel focus on emerging supplier states, such as India and Pakistan, for 
materials and technology integration.126 
Even though secondary proliferation poses a significant problem in the future, 
particularly since more states will be less constrained by international pressures and 
technology and know-how will be easier to obtain, the emerging international system 
may actually hold the key to preventing secondary proliferation.  Norms and regimes, 
like export controls and international partnerships to combat the spread of illicit nuclear 
materials, could effectively curb secondary proliferation.  Furthermore, if we are to 
believe that states will perceive the emerging system as less certain, states may choose to 
withhold technical assistance to other states in fear that it may actually come back to be 
detrimental to their security in the future.   
Thus, it is important to examine the unique aspects of states with regard to 
capacity.  Some states may be able to easily obtain uranium for enrichment, while others 
find it difficult.  Some states may be getting backdoor assistance from other states like 
China, Pakistan, or North Korea.  Finally, capacity must be examined with regard to will.  
Is a state likely to attempt to overcome capacity shortfalls such as economic capacity by 
diverting funds and effort from other projects or government functions?   
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CHAPTER 3 TURKEY: IN THE PATH OF A NUCLEAR CASCADE? 
 
According to Stephen Larabee of the RAND Corporation, “Turkey would 
consider developing the nuclear option only as a last resort—if, say, its relations with the 
United States declined, Ankara no longer saw NATO's guarantees as credible, and the EU 
rejected Turkey's membership.”127  Although each of these prospects is possible, they are 
by no means enough to drive Ankara to begin a nuclear weapons program due to a 
number of other factors that are not so likely to change due to the shifts in balance of 
power in the emerging international system, particularly Turkey’s shift towards the 
Middle East where it seeks to play a regional leadership role.  Furthermore, it is likely 
that Ankara will calculate that refusing to pursue nuclear weapons will give the prestige it 
is looking for. 
Security Environment 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
Many analysts worry that Turkey is at high risk of pursuing nuclear weapons if 
Iran continues its ambitious enrichment projects.  Ankara is not necessarily only worried 
about the direct threat that a nuclear capable state on its borders poses, it is also 
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concerned about larger instability that might be caused by Iranian pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.128 
Several factors contribute to increased vulnerability of Turkey. First, many fear 
that Turkey will not sit idly by as Iran continues defying the IAEA as well as its 
enrichment projects.  A nuclear capable Iran on its borders will surely make some 
Turkish officials nervous.  Furthermore, Ankara is concerned about larger destabilization 
in the region.  The Iraq War has destabilized the region already to the point it has become 
one of the most pressing aspects of Turkey’s security environment.129  Analysts believe 
that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will destabilize the Middle East to an even 
greater degree.130  This demonstrates that, even if Turkish officials are not concerned 
about a nuclear-armed Iran, they will be concerned about the destabilization that occurs 
throughout the region afterwards.  Alexandra Bell explains, “The Turks look around them 
and see conflicts and threats in most directions.”131  She also claims that these factors and 
the shifting security environment are directly leading to the attitudes and opinions of 
Turkish policymakers. Bell spoke to one unnamed Turkish official in particular that 
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proclaimed, “Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb” if Iran obtained a 
nuclear weapon.132   
In addition to the changing security threats in the region, security assurances, or 
possible lack thereof, will also play an important role in Turkey’s calculations in the 
future. In the face of deteriorating relations within NATO, particularly with regard to 
Turkey, Ankara is skeptical of the solid security assurance once given by NATO and the 
United States.133  This sentiment is exacerbated by America’s desire to withdraw tactical 
nuclear weapons from Europe, including Turkey.  Ankara not only wants American 
tactical nuclear weapons to remain on Turkish soil for the tangible deterrent effects they 
offer, but also because some Turkish officials “believe that nuclear sharing is both 
symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO 
have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack.”134  For some Turkish 
officials the symbolic effect of keeping US tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil 
displays that the U.S. is still committed to Turkish security, even in a time when the 
future of NATO is uncertain, particularly for Turkey.   
It is easy to see that the uncertainty of the emerging international system is 
leading to a shift in Turkey’s security environment.  First, as Iran continues to defy the 
IAEA in pursuit of enrichment, the Middle East is becoming destabilized as states 
consider how and if to balance a new regional superpower.  Furthermore, uncertainty of 
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security threats is leading to the uncertainty of the future of NATO.  Since NATO no 
longer has the Soviet Union as a certain enemy, it has to reassess its role in the world, and 
the security of Turkey is not among its priorities.  Even with these uncertainties, the 
security environment will not drive Turkey towards the bomb.    
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons 
It is important to examine Turkish behavior with regard to nuclear weapons 
without considering the international system.  Is it possible these trends, even if only in 
part, will continue?  Why would things be any different under multipolarity?  Is the future 
of Turkey’s security environment changing so rapidly and becoming more uncertain? The 
changes in Turkey’s security environment have been slowly developing over decades.  
Furthermore, uncertainty does not seem to be a large issue.  To clarify, it is easy to 
understand uncertainty surrounding Iran’s intentions, the future of NATO, or Turkey’s 
future relations with the EU, but at least Ankara can be certain about the issues at hand. 
Since these changes in Turkish policies and behavior have been happening for a while 
now, we should be able to see some sort of movement toward increasing security through 
traditional means.  Instead, what we see is Ankara becoming more empowered as it 
becomes more independent from the West.  Turkey is not behaving like a state that is 
fearful of an unpredictable and dangerous security environment being ushered in by the 
emerging system.  As Ian O. Lesser explains, “Turks prefer to focus on intentions rather 
than capabilities when debating proliferation in their neighborhood.  Improved relations 
with Teheran and Damascus have simply lowered the perception of risk.”135 
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Some analysts argue that Turkey is not concerned with nuclear weapons on its 
borders because it tolerated the arsenal of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.  
Skeptics, and those that agree with the neo-realist assumptions, would claim that it is only 
because Turkey was a part of NATO and had NATO nuclear weapons on its soil.  
Skeptics would also claim that the fact Turkey wants U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to 
remain within Turkish borders is a sign that Ankara values nuclear weapons.  If Turkey 
really believed that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter a nuclear Iran, however, 
then it is doubtful that U.S. tactical weapons would play much of a role in Turkish 
calculations.136  The weapons currently in Turkey would “take months to prepare them 
for battle.”137  Additionally, NATO weapons require a complex 27-nation decision 
process before use.  The weapons currently on Turkish soil really had no direct effects.   
Naturally, some analysts may predict that Turkey might not be so willing in the 
future to continue practicing nuclear restraint, especially given the uncertainty of the 
future of NATO or Iran’s intentions, but Turkey has demonstrated a long tradition of not 
relying on nuclear weapons.  Turkish officials are surely adding in their calculations 
American and European concern over Iranian intentions and aspirations, which may 
reassure Ankara that, even without a formal alliance, American and European actions will 
play to Turkey’s favor.  Given the growing relationship between Ankara and Tehran, it 
does not seem that Turkish leaders would calculate they are at imminent risk of a possible 
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future Iranian nuclear capability.  Given this perception of Turkey’s security 
environment, it would not make sense that Ankara would pursue nuclear weapons.  
Also, many authors cite Turkey’s vehement opposition to the Iraq war as one of 
the major signs of a US-Turkey split.  Stephen F. Larabee claims, “81 percent of Turks 
disapproved (and only seven percent approved) of President George W. Bush’s handling 
of international policies.”138  This does not necessarily mean that US-Turkey relations are 
falling apart.  Some of the United State’s closes Allies, France, Germany, and Canada, 
were also vehemently against the foreign policies of the Bush administration.  Even 
further, France had worse relations with NATO far longer than Turkey’s supposed falling 
out.  Yet, despite these issues, the alliance stuck together (though, I’m sure my critics will 
point out that France had their own nuclear arsenal).   
First, as mentioned above, Turkey seeks to play a leadership role in the Middle 
East, and a larger, more prominent role in the international community.  Despite 
legitimate concerns of security and Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, pursuing 
nuclear weapons would be even more harmful to Turkey’s prestige and leadership than 
choosing not to proliferate.  Even though Alexandra Bell claims that Turkey would 
immediately pursue its own nuclear deterrent should Iran obtain a bomb, she also 
acknowledges that much leadership in Turkey, with whom she spoke directly, showed 
little interest in an Iranian nuclear capability, explaining that the Turks and the Persians 
have not been in conflict with each other in over 500 years.139   It is unfortunate that so 
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many analysts and commentators focus so heavily on sensationalized statements ignoring 
other sentiments.   
 
Economic Interests 
Turkey’s economic interests and its internationalization model of economic 
development will be strong motivators for Turkish politicians and leaders to forgo 
nuclear weapons programs.  Turkey has a long tradition of working with the West—both 
the EU and the United States—and is not likely to give up the advantages of these 
relationships even though they may not be as strong as they used to be.  Furthermore, for 
the foreseeable future, Turkey remains committed to joining the EU, or at least 
maintaining good relations, and will not jeopardize this special relationship in exchange 
for nuclear weapons research.   
Though having faced a great number of setbacks and challenges, Turkey remains 
committed to accession to the European Union, and evidence of Ankara’s commitment is 
still evident.  In early May 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan proclaimed, “We are 
preserving our determination to join the EU.”  He continued, “We are fulfilling our 
commitments in the best way to harmonize with the [EU] acquis.”140  Turkey has spent 
the last six years as an EU candidate implementing a number of reforms to meet EU 
accession criteria.141  Further, some analysts and observers emphasize that it took Spain 8 
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years to become an EU member, so it is likely that Turkey will remain patient,142 
especially given the harsh economic environment that surely makes many European 
leaders cautious to take on any more responsibility.  If Turkey were to seek nuclear 
weapons, its relationship with the EU would surely be severely damaged, ending Turkish 
hopes of becoming a part of the world’s largest economic bloc. 
Interestingly, Ankara’s economic ties with Iran also demonstrate reasons why 
Turkey might not be willing and ready to proliferate in the future.  Avi Jorisch explains 
the extent of the Turkish-Iranian economic relationship: 
In 2008, the two countries conducted $10 billion of business, and officials from 
both countries have called for an increase to $20 billion by 2012.  Iran exports 
mostly oil and gas to the Turkish market.  Naturally, Turkey wants to fuel its 
economy, and Turkish officials have made it clear that they will look to all 
available sources of energy, including Iran.143   
Additionally, until May 2011, “Turkish companies and banks regularly abuse the 
financial system to facilitate payments to [Iran],” as explained by the Hürriyet Daily 
News.144  One should not perceive this type of facilitation as direct Iranian support by the 
Turkish government; however, the Turkish government did not try to stop it until late 
May 2011 when Turkish banks finally officially cut all ties with Iran’s top bank.145  This 
is particularly telling given Turkey’s many attempts to, “[help] Iran circumvent 
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intentional sanctions.”146  It seems as if Turkey places more importance in economic 
strength than security concerns over a nuclear Iran.   
 
Ideational Factors 
In addition to the security environment, it is necessary to also examine a variety 
of characteristics including the role prestige plays in decision-making, domestic political 
dynamics, and the governmental structure itself.   
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
For some analysts, even if the changing security environment is not enough to 
push Turkey towards proliferation, prestige may complement security concerns and push 
the country to its own bomb.  Even though Turkey may not fear a conventional war with 
Iran, prestige is likely to play a role in Ankara’s nuclear calculations.  As Turkey’s 
identity grows further and further from the West since the end of the Cold War, its 
policies have shifted to become a leader in the Muslim world, as well as maintaining 
close relations with the West, including the EU and NATO.147 Avi Jorisch explains, “If 
Iran goes nuclear, it will become the regional hegemon, extinguishing Ankara’s hopes of 
becoming a key player in the Middle East.”148 Turkey’s perception of prestige is closely 
linked with a changing perception of its own identity.  Once aligned closely with the 
West, it is now growing closer and closer to the Middle East, and now wishes to play a 
larger role in this region.    
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With the Cold War over, Turkey is less constrained by geopolitical pressures and 
now pursues foreign policies that would not have been possible under intense pressure 
from the United States.  Furthermore, Turkey’s domestic politics are becoming more 
conservative, more religious, and more nationalist.149  For example, breaking away from 
the West, Turkish policy has become more pro-Palestinian.  This in itself is not an 
indicator of Turkey looking for a new place in the Middle East, but in January 2006, 
Prime Minister Erdogan hosted a high-ranking Hamas delegation in Ankara “hoping that 
the visit would highlight Turkey’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role in the Middle 
East.”  A clear indicator that Ankara is less constrained than in previous years, Erdogan 
arranged these meetings without first consulting Washington or Jerusalem.150   
Another example of Turkey attempting to play a larger role in the Middle East 
outside of a NATO or Western-led coalition is its opposition to sanctions on Iran with 
regard to its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Ankara had long pushed for a nuclear 
fuel swap deal with Tehran in place of increased sanctions from the West.  In May 2011, 
Ankara finally signed a deal with Tehran in which Iran would ship low-enriched uranium 
to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods.  Under this agreement, the low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) would remain property of Iran while in storage in Turkey.151  Prime Minister 
Erdogan has proclaimed that this deal has eliminated the need for new sanctions aimed at 
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Tehran.152  This example is not important with regard to whether or not this deal will 
actually work, but rather because it demonstrates Ankara’s search for a greater role in the 
region by attempting to broker a compromise between the West and Iran.  As mentioned 
above, should Iran obtain a nuclear weapon, the regional dynamics and diplomacy would 
dramatically shift against the interests of Turkey.   
Given the above examples of Turkey attempting to demonstrate its powerful role 
in the region, it is likely that Ankara is more concerned about the diplomatic and 
symbolic effects of an Iranian bomb. It is not unreasonable to predict that Turkish 
leadership will seek its own nuclear capability to keep up with its impending nuclear 
neighbor much like France pursued nuclear weapons during the Cold War.  A shift in the 
balance of influence would severely damage Ankara’s intentions of becoming a leader in 
Middle East.   
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons 
The international system has focused so heavily on Iranian nuclear aspirations 
that Turkey really doesn’t need to; thus, the international community (or, the West, more 
accurately) is working harder on Turkey’s security environment, even if only indirectly. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has become less constrained both politically and 
in terms of security threats.  This is where the real shift in Turkish policies is happening.  
Instead of Turkey feeling more vulnerable to threats, it is feeling more empowered to 
assert itself in global politics.  
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The structure of the Turkish government will surely pose logistical problems 
should Turkish leadership choose to pursue nuclear weapons.   Because Turkey is an 
open democratic society, building a clandestine nuclear weapons program will be 
difficult.153  According to a poll conducted in early 2011, only three percent of Turks 
believe that the biggest threat to Turkey comes from Iran; 43 percent, on the other hand, 
believe that the largest threat comes from the United States.154  It is not likely that the 
public will allow their political leaders to pursue nuclear weapons under these conditions, 
so any effort to do so would have to be done clandestinely.  Furthermore, environmental 
concerns are growing in importance in Turkey, which has grave concerns over the 
negative aspects of nuclear energy.155  This growing movement will make Turkish 
nuclear energy ambitions more difficult to fulfill, thus making the possible pursuit of 
nuclear weapons even more difficult in Turkey’s democratic system.  
Furthermore, Turkey has a good track record when it comes to nuclear norms and 
regimes.  The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) explains, “Turkey is not known to possess 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member and in 
good standing of all the major treaties governing their acquisition and use.”156 Turkey is 
either a party or signatory to arms control, nuclear, chemical, biological, testing, and 
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technology regimes including: NPT, IAEA Additional Protocol, CTBR, PTBT, Chemical 
Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, PSI, and many others.157  Whether 
genuinely, or for self-serving purposes, Turkey has demonstrated a strong commitment to 
norms and regimes.  It is not likely that this will change in the future.  Furthermore, if 
Turkish officials do begin to stray from these norms, it will surely be met with intense 
resistance from the international community.  It is much more likely that Turkey will 
obtain the prestige it seeks in the Middle East by demonstrating to other Middle East 
states that reliance on norms and regimes are superior to the pursuit of nuclear weapons, 
particularly given the many voices calling for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle 
East.   
 
Capacity 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
According to NTI, Turkey has the technological capability to establish a 
successful nuclear energy program.  NTI explains, “However, it lacks nuclear power 
reactors and commercial-scale fuel cycle capabilities, meaning that foreign suppliers will 
be key to Ankara's success in launching a nuclear power program.158  Turkey plans to 
build additional reactors, and the recent Fukushima disaster in Japan has not deterred 
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Turkey from pursuing nuclear energy.159  Prime Minister Erdogan has proclaimed that his 
goal is to have at least 20 reactors online by 2030 with the help of Russian and Japanese 
companies for the first plants.160   
Turkey may also have a way to gain the know-how and tacit knowledge necessary 
to build a nuclear weapons program.  According to Leon Fuerth, it is possible that nuclear 
scientists with knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons from the former Soviet 
Republics may have made their way into Turkey.161   
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons 
These ambitious goals are not guaranteed to come to fruition.  NTI explains that 
Turkey has had plans to pursue nuclear power on three separate occasions, and each time, 
“financial limitations and domestic or international political constraints prevented 
success.”162  Unless things change, Turkey will not have the economic capacity to pursue 
nuclear weapons in the future.  Given Turkey’s ambitious nuclear energy goals, however, 
analysts should watch to make sure technology is not being diverted to clandestine 
nuclear weapons projects.  In this case, it seems as if economic capacity, combined with 
economic interests, is keeping a state from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.   
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Conclusions 
The grim prospects that Iran poses to not only Turkey’s security environment, but 
also its economic and political goals, combined with deteriorating NATO security 
assurances, indicate that analysts must indeed keep a close eye on Ankara’s possible 
nuclear weapons developments.  
We should not fear that Turkey is in the path of a nuclear cascade sweeping 
through the Middle East as a result of bold Iranian enrichment projects.  If the changes in 
the emerging international system were to cause major shifts in nuclear calculations, 
Turkey’s policies would already be showing signs of caution and stronger security and 
defense policies.  Instead, Turkey is pursuing more active and unrestrained policies with 
regard to economic policy and diplomacy.   It is clear that Turkey is not too concerned 
with an Iranian nuclear capability, as neo-realist theory would predict, because Ankara 
seems to be enabling Iran’s uranium enrichment projects.  Turkey’s economic policies 
are bolstering Iran’s economic capacity.   Simultaneously, Iran’s diplomatic efforts with 
regard to nuclear fuel trade are averting international pressure and defying Western 
efforts to stop Iranian enrichment.   
Thus, it is clear that other factors clearly play a stronger role than the shifting 
balance of power that is clearly taking place in the Middle East.  Two factors play a role 
in particular: prestige and economics.  Whereas it is beyond the scope of this project to 
assess the personalities of individual Turkish leaders, and the extent of their influence, 
the policies examined above demonstrate a collective aspect of the personalities of 
Turkish policymakers.  Prestige in this case reflects the collective personalities of Turkish 
leadership in what Hymans would label a sportsmanlike subaltern.  Turkey is looking to 
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improve its status by resisting the influence of more powerful states, while at the same 
time, working within the international community to achieve its goals.  Economics, on 
the other hand, are important to Turkish officials not only for the improvement of the 
country, but also as a way to form closer relationships with countries in the region, 
whether Europe or the Middle East.  
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CHAPTER 4 IRAN: ON THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? 
 
Many analysts and commentators speak as if Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is 
fact; however, all that is known is that Iran is currently pursuing large uranium 
enrichment projects.  Most people in Washington already believe that Iran is definitively 
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, according to Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.163  On the other hand, Iranians maintain that their 
program is for peaceful purposes only.   
Whereas the evidence of Iran’s nuclear research is unsettling, it does not mean 
that Iran will choose to go the extra step to weaponize.   Many factors exist that may keep 
Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons despite its pursuit of uranium enrichment.  Such 
factors include security concerns in the globalizing system, economic concerns, 
personalities of the divided leadership—including the possible existence of norms and 
religious edicts—as well as the technological capacity, which is being affected by the 
globalizing economy as well.   
Iran began its nuclear research in the 1960s under rule of the Shah, and according 
to Jon Wolfsthal, has had an “on again, off again march toward mastering the entire 
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nuclear fuel cycle.”164   Over the years, Iran has hidden its enrichment projects from the 
international community and has defied the IAEA on several accounts.  Furthermore, 
Tehran has dealt on the black market to obtain uranium and know-how, including 
transactions with A.Q. Khan165 and dealings with foreign governments such as South 
Africa.  Because Iran’s nuclear progress thus far stretches decades, long before anyone 
could hope to assess what the emerging international system would look like, it is 
difficult to assess whether or not any of its current activities are a direct result of shifts in 
the international system.  It is not unthinkable that Iran might not decide to pursue 
weaponization, as a number of countries have conducted extensive enrichment research 
ultimately deciding not to weaponize including Brazil, Argentina, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Iraq, just to name a few.166  
Should one closely examine documents and analyses of Iran’s nuclear program, 
one theme is immediately obvious: inconsistency.  Analysts can’t agree on Iran’s 
intentions, its progress, or even when and if it was enriching uranium at various points in 
time.  Perhaps classified evidence exists that would be crucial in discovering the real 
answer but, for those of us who do not have access to such information, I would like to 
present an alternate point of view—one that challenges the assumptions many take as 
fact.  Iran is certainly influenced by international pressures, and the strength of such 
pressures is growing due to the current changes in the international system as described in 
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the previous chapters.  These pressures must be taken into account, but they are often 
ignored or dismissed.   
Even Schelling, despite believing himself that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon, 
acknowledges that no one knows whether or not Iran is actually planning on weaponizing 
the fissile material it is currently attempting to produce.167  Likewise, several high-
ranking U.S. officials do not speak or act as if Iran is definitively pursuing a nuclear 
weapon.  For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is quoted as saying, 
“They're not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time."168  Furthermore, 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has recently stated, “Iran's nuclear 
decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international 
community opportunities to influence Tehran."169  The statements of these high-ranking 
officials give us some limited insight into what intelligence is assessing of Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program, albeit only to a small degree.  It is important to note that the reactions 
and rhetoric of some of the nation’s highest defense and intelligence officials are not 
consistent with that of the elected officials explained above.   
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Security Environment 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
Many claim that the Motivations of Iran to proliferate are based heavily on 
concerns about its security environment.  Indeed, Iran lies on the edge of the international 
system without any real allies.  Furthermore, it is surely concerned about American 
presence in the region, and has historically been concerned about other actors in the 
region, particularly Iraq.  As Joseph Cirincione explains, Iran exists on the edge of the 
“periphery of the international system,” and such states have a more acute sense of 
threats to their national security.  Further, states in Iran’s position on the periphery have 
more incentive to pursue a nuclear weapon.170  Iran is balancing against a variety of 
powers, globally and regionally. They will continue to perceive threats from both 
regional and global powers.  More generally, Iran hopes that a nuclear capability will 
reduce or eliminate U.S. interference or opposition to Iran’s domestic and foreign 
policies.171  
Shahram Chubin explains, “Iran’s nuclear weapons program was part of a broader 
attempt to become more self-reliant in arms and technology in the 1980s.”  He continues, 
“Increasingly isolated, Tehran struggled to acquire arms to fight Iraq, which used 
chemical weapons and had a nuclear weapons program. The eight-year war was the 
Middle East’s bloodiest modern conflict. Iran’s nuclear program was an outgrowth of this 
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experience.”172  Ayatollah Khomeini approved Iran’s modern nuclear program, which 
began in 1985 when Iran saw the advances of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
program.  “Iranian leaders concluded,” Colonel Anthony C. Cain explains, “that they 
could ill afford to allow regional competitors to gain again the upper hand in the nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons arena.”173  Cain continues, “The U.S.-led coalition’s 
apparent difficulty in dismantling the Iraqi program during and after Operation Desert 
Storm left the Iranians with little confidence in international collective security 
mechanisms.”174  Iran’s distrust of collective security mechanisms underlines the self-
help factor that is characteristic of realist interpretations. Iran now has even more power 
to balance against in the region, and a bomb is an easy way to balance against those 
powers in the face of deteriorating conventional capabilities.175   
Before 9/11, Iran’s prime motivation to seek a deterrent capability was Iraq, but 
since, the United States has become the primary reason behind motivations to proliferate 
“to compensate for strategic isolation….”176 The United States occupies and maintains a 
strong presence on two of Iran’s borders, and has military bases in countries throughout 
the Middle East, as well as tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey, a NATO ally, which 
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surely exacerbates feelings of insecurity in Tehran.  Further, Israel, as the primary enemy 
of Iran in the region, possesses nuclear weapons.  Finally, it is likely that Iran feels more 
insecure because of the American arms deal with Saudi Arabia providing $60 billon in 
arms sales.   
Additionally, as Willis Stanley explains, “…Iranian lack of trust in the 
international ‘system’ makes it difficult to construct a set of positive inducements that 
would both preclude Iranian deception and provide reassurance to the Iranians that the 
deal struck will be honored by the ‘Great Satan’ and its minions.”177  Recent U.S. claims 
and statements of both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have exacerbated 
this distrust.  Under the George W. Bush administration, U.S. Officials iterated time and 
time again that it had nothing but violent intentions concerning Iran’s nuclear program.  
It’s only been eight years since President George W. Bush called for regime change in 
Tehran in his State of the Union Address.178  Further, “President Bush had denounced the 
governments of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil’” with ties to 
international terrorism.”179  Even more recently, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has 
reassured Iran that the United States will not rule out the use of force, including nuclear 
force, for states continuing to pursue nuclear weapons programs.180   
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Finally, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review boldly states, “[T]he United States is 
now prepared to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative security assurance’ by declaring 
that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.”181  This phrasing is also a signal that the United States reserves 
the right to use nuclear force against states that are not in compliance with NPT 
obligations, including Iran.   
As Iraq, once Iran’s most pressing foe in the region, is no longer an imminent 
threat to Iranian security, Israel and the United States have recently demonstrated the 
extent of their capabilities and ability to extend power throughout the region.  Some 
analysts conclude that, in order for Iran to balance this power, it needs nuclear weapons.   
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation 
Israel has a history of attacking places that it thinks might have nuclear weapons.  
Israel attacked a site in Syria in 2007, and a site in Iraq in 1981.  Furthermore, the United 
States has a demonstrated track record of complete regime change. Some analysts have 
argued that Iran has certainly learned from these lessons and, as a result, constructed its 
nuclear enrichment plants deep underground all across the country.182   
Furthermore, Iranian officials may not perceive Israel and the United States as 
great threats to Iran.  Etel Solingen argues that the claims of analysts who argue that 
Israel and the United States are driving Tehran towards nuclear weapons because of the 
security environment they have created in the region are not accurate.  She argues that the 
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drive towards nuclearization in the 1980s was mainly a result of the threat Iraq posed.183   
Solingen explains, “…[B]ut many in Iran disagree with the premise of these threats or 
how to cope with them, pointing to nuclear weapons as potentially undermining or 
enhancing security, depending on the eyes of Iranian beholders.”184 
 
Economic Interests 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons  
Willis Stanley stresses that we “must consider the near total role petroleum 
products play in Iran’s calculus.”185  Whereas oil embargos and targeted sanctions would 
be effective, Stanley explains further, “[T]he mechanics for organizing such an effort are 
vulnerable to exactly the tactics at such the Iranian leadership excels.”186  The weapon of 
choice in attempting to coerce Tehran to halt its nuclear research is sanctions. Sanctions 
have not only come from the United States, but Europe, and the international community 
as a whole in the form of U.N. resolutions.  The United States has had sanctions in place 
on Iran since 1979, and five American presidential administrations have imposed 
sanctions since.187  Since 2006, The U.N. Security Council has passed six resolutions 
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designed to eliminate Tehran’s ability to pursue its ambitious nuclear research.188  James 
Dobbins of the RAND Corporation explained in a testimony to Congress in December 
2009, “Further international sanctions will probably not compel a change in Iran’s 
nuclear policies nor cause a halt to those programs.”189  Whereas Dobbins explained that 
sanctions have not worked historically,190 other reasons exist why sanctions will be 
ineffective in Iran. In 2010, Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney wrote argue that sanctions 
“…will not be ‘crippling’, as Mrs. Clinton once promised, because they do not directly 
strike at the Islamic Republic's lifeblood - its oil revenues, which total in the tens of 
billions.”191  The authors continue, “As a result, it will now focus its energies on averting, 
circumventing, insulating and even exploiting them, endeavours that the regime has 
elevated to an art form.”192 
Furthermore, sanctions may be ineffective because Iranian leadership focuses its 
economic resources toward weaponizing instead of other areas they may be needed. 
Commentators argue that sanctions will remain ineffective because Iran is so motivated 
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to pursue nuclear weapons it will not allow economic restraints get in its way.193  This is 
similar to Pakistan’s approach to nuclear weapons after the United States placed 
sanctions on the country in attempt to halt Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  
Instead of diverting money away from the nuclear program to benefit the Pakistani 
people, Prime Minister Bhutto vowed that the Pakistani people will "eat grass" if 
necessary in order to develop nuclear weapons.194   
For a while, the emerging international system worked in Tehran’s favor as it 
used banks in Turkey to sidestep sanctions.  Turkey was desperate enough for a closer 
economic relationship that it was willing to work with Iran in exchange for economic 
support.  This relationship made it possible for Iranian funds to enter Europe under the 
auspices of Turkish banks.195  In May 2011, however, Turkey terminated this 
relationship, and Iran can no longer rely on Turkish banks to sidestep sanctions.196 
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation 
The economic interests of Iran are a vulnerability of its nuclear weapons program 
because they rely so much on materials obtained from outside of its borders and produced 
and delivered by other states.  The increased interdependence of the emerging system will 
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only exacerbate this problem, making Iran even more vulnerable to external political 
economic pressure.  Matthew Levitt Claims that, because of the globalized economy, 
unilateral sanctions from the United States will be more effective than previous 
sanctions.197   
The Iran Primer explains, “Increased international pressure and sanctions are 
likely to increase the program’s costs, which is also likely to make the program more 
contentious at home – and potentially exacerbate existing political differences in the 
leadership.”198  The document continues to argue, “The weapons component of the 
program has never been debated or acknowledged and further revelations or costs 
associated with it could make it more controversial.”199  Thus, sanctions and lack of 
material for a nuclear weapons program could make the costs of weaponization 
unacceptable.   
Iran has been pursuing its enrichment experiments using 600 tons of yellowcake 
uranium bought from South Africa in the 1970s, and its supply is diminishing.200  And 
even though Iran mines its own Uranium, it does not have enough to fulfill the needs of a 
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nuclear power program, according to Jacqueline Shire.201  It depleted its stockpiles of 
uranium in its mines in the 1970s.202 
This does not mean that Iran is incapable of getting more uranium, but it does 
mean that Iran has to rely on other states to supply the needed material.  This means that 
Iran is even more susceptible to international pressure.  Iran currently looks to several 
states from which to purchase uranium including Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  A 
coalition of Western States including the United States, Canada, France, Britain, 
Germany, as well as Australia have lobbied the governments of these countries not to sell 
uranium to Iran.203 
Bahgat explains that several international companies on which Iran relied for its 
nuclear program have backed out of the country as a result of pressure from the United 
States.204  Furthermore, their program has relied heavily on foreign assistance, 
particularly form China, Pakistan, and Russia at different times throughout its 
existence.205  Is it possible that Chinese assistance will grow because of China’s growing 
power in the emerging system?  What about Russia?  Will its influence grow weaker?  
The EU is already trying policies to offer incentives coupled with unfavorable 
side effects with regard to Iran.  Bahgat explains, “Since the early 2000s, the EU has 
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negotiated a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with Iran.”  He continues, “The 
EU has established linkages between progress on the TCA negotiations and changes in 
Iran’s position on the Arab-Israeli peace process, terrorism, and proliferation of 
WMD.”206  In 2003, France, Germany, and the UK started negotiations with Iran that 
eventually led to Tehran signing the Additional Protocol of the NPT and to freeze some 
of its nuclear activities.207  This is not to say that this has been completely successful, as 
Iran has recently stated that it has resumed enrichment, but it does demonstrate a linkage 
between economic incentives and norms.   
 
Ideational Factors 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
In addition to Iran’s security environment, many analysts, commentators, and 
observers also acknowledge the large role that state characteristics play in Iran, 
particularly the sense of prestige pursued by the state’s leadership.  The Iran Primer 
explains that Iran’s nuclear program has “unfolded in context of its overall policies,”208 
which were created in order to obtain prestige and self-reliance. If we are to believe the 
Iran Primer, then it is unlikely that the emerging international system has had anything to 
do with its nuclear enrichment projects.  If anything, it was under the bipolar system that 
many of the drivers of Iran’s nuclear program came into existence.      
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 Bahgat explains, “Most Iranians perceive their nation as a great civilization that 
has been deprived of its ‘rightful’ status as a regional superpower by foreign intervention, 
including the Russian, British, and American.”209   Iran’s leadership has not only declared 
its right to enrich uranium again and again, but it has also demonstrated how prestige 
comes from scientific endeavors, as well as from defying the West.   
 A group of researchers from a variety of academic institutions in the United States 
and France conducted a psychological survey of a “small but politically significant 
portion of the Iranian population” has found that many Iranians have begun to see nuclear 
energy as a “sacred value” which may lead many Iranians to think of nuclear energy in 
terms beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis.210   
 More recently, though once quiet on the issue, Ayatollah Khamenei has spoken 
about Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.  The supreme leader has proclaimed, “We only 
seek to awaken the spirit of dignity in the whole of the Muslim community,” which was 
apparently in response to an IAEA report just a few days earlier.211  This demonstrates 
that, even though analysts often rely on the deep divisions within Iranian leadership, 
consistency exists throughout with regard to importance of pursuing nuclear energy.   
Karim Sadjadpour, Ali Vaez, and Fariborz Ghadar argue, “A combination of 
misguided nationalism and government misinformation has compelled many non-official 
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Iranian elites -- including staunch regime critics -- to support the Islamic Republic's self-
professed ‘inalienable’ nuclear pursuits.”212  Additionally, the Iran Primer, published by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains:  
The program may also have been a byproduct of the troubled revolution’s 
omnipresent need for legitimacy and Iranian nationalism’s quest for respect and 
international status. Tehran has long sought access to nuclear technology 
generally as a key to development and a means of restoring its former greatness as 
a center of scientific progress…. The regime views the international community’s 
dictates as an attack on a founding principle of the revolution, namely Iran’s 
independence from outside influence or intervention.213 
Self-reliance is not only a key founding value of the republic,214 but also a lesson learned 
after its protracted war with Iraq.  It is also likely that sanctions will exacerbate feelings 
among Tehran’s leaders that it must be self-reliant because the West, particularly the 
United States, has consistently attempted to coerce Iran with sanctions and even threats of 
regime change.    
 The Iranian nuclear issue has transformed due to domestic politics across several 
different periods of time.  Initially, they argue, the nuclear issue was supposed to be a 
national issue, and “there appeared to be a general consensus among the political elite…” 
with regard to enriching uranium.215  In recent years, the issue has become much more 
politicized, and both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad use the issue to “stigmatize” their 
critics.  Reformists were labeled as being soft, complacent to demands of the United 
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States, and “willing to negotiate away Iran’s Interests.”216  Through this kind of political 
isolation, the forces within the Iranian government pushing Tehran away from nuclear 
weapons are becoming weaker and weaker.  For some, this indicates that the domestic 
political processes will actually facilitate Iranian proliferation.   
 Could this combination of prestige, self-reliance, and domestic politics push 
Tehran towards constructing a nuclear weapon?   
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation 
Although the issue of prestige and the personalities of some of Iran’s key 
leadership would indicate that Iran is on the path to the bomb, when examined more 
closely, the evidence becomes much more complex and nuanced.  In this section, I will 
examine the characteristics of the Iranian government that are pushing it away from the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.   
Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, has written extensively on what he believes 
to be Iran’s true motivations and intentions in his book, The Devil We Know: Dealing 
with the New Iranian Superpower.  He not only dismisses many of the assumptions he 
believes American’s have taken for granted, he seeks to restructure the way Americans, 
both the public and the government, understand Iran.  “President Ahmadinejad is…a 
figurehead no more able to take Iran to war than Joseph McCarthy was able to take 
America to war against Communism,” claims Baer.  Iran’s real leaders,” he continues, 
“are rational, pragmatic, and calculating.”217   
                                                
216 Shahram Chubin, "The Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program," p. 83. 
217 Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, (New 
York: Thre Rivers Press, 2008), p. 77.   
   
    81   
Baer claims that Americans are too focused on the worst-case scenario, which is 
not what Tehran really wants.218  A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) claimed 
that Tehran stopped its pursuit of a bomb in 2003.  To Baer, this indicated two things: 
that Iran was in no hurry to obtain a bomb; and that nuclear weapons are not essential to 
Iran’s security.219  Because Iran’s leadership is calculated and patient, Baer argues, 
“Right now, at least, Iranians don’t need a nuclear bomb.”  He continues, “If a war is to 
be fought…Iran will almost certainly fall back on its asymmetrical tactics and weapons.”  
He concludes by indicating that Iran will likely calculate that the continued pursuit of a 
bomb will be more detrimental than relying on these other tactics and strategies.220 
As mentioned above as a facilitator of proliferation, Iran is driven by prestige, but 
it is possible that prestige, like with Turkey, will actually push Tehran away from 
producing nuclear weapons.  “Iran wanted to be taken seriously as a major power,” 
claims Baer, “in the same way it wanted to control the Hormuz and the world’s oil.”221  
He continues,   
 But at the same time, the Iranians see a nuclear bomb as nice to have but 
not crucial to their survival…. Iran may not yet have nukes, but it has three things 
that are vastly more important: highly developed asymmetrical fighting skills and 
weapons; a growing army of hungry, disaffected, street-smart fighters; and an 
invincible anticolonial message. With that, Iran has set the stage for its push 
toward empire—a push they’ve already begun.222  
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Thus, in a complicated political environment where various factions of the 
government are pitted against each other, those in favor of weaponization may not be so 
dead set on obtaining a bomb when prestige can be obtained other ways.   
The Iran Primer explains, “The most fundamental difference is whether Iran 
should continue as a revolutionary state willing to defy the world, or whether it should 
settle down and become a normal state that plays by international rules. The nuclear issue 
is increasingly a reflection of this basic division.”223  This may mean that the will of the 
leadership to enhance its position and standing in the world may be largely affected by 
the emerging international system.  Could leadership that is rational and bases much of its 
decisions on cost benefit analyses see that weaponization is actually harming its position?   
With regard to norms and institutions, the most common assumption among 
analysts is that Iranian leadership does not adhere to them.  It is important to remember 
that Iran has shown no signal of leaving the NPT thus far, despite several violations and 
attempts to side-step IAEA regulations and inspections.  Even if it does not idealistically 
agree with the goals of the IAEA and the NPT, it goes to great lengths to maintain a 
relationship with the organizations.  Furthermore, stronger evidence of norms exists 
within Iran.   
Before 2005, many within Iranian politics opposed enrichment.224   If these 
aspects of the Iranian government become more prominent in the future, is it possible that 
they will be more willing to negotiate and cooperate with the West?  Furthermore, is it 
possible that they will give up the idea that uranium enrichment, and nuclear weapons, 
                                                
223 Shahram Chubin, "The Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program," p. 82.   
224 Ibid., p. 84.  
   
    83   
are not needed to bolster Iranian prestige?  This does not seem likely given the recent 
growing rift between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad.  It is more likely that hardliners will 
continue to expand their dominance within Iranian politics.   
Furthermore, often talked about in passing, Iranian leadership claims that 
Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa prohibiting the production and use of nuclear 
weapons.  Unfortunately, no one has ever seen this fatwa, as it has never been published.  
But the fact that Iranian leadership claims it exists is quite meaningful in itself.  Whereas 
it is certainly not an assurance that the Islamic Republic will not build nuclear weapons, it 
does demonstrate that the existence of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to some. 
Furthermore, in February 2010, Khamenei reemphasized that Islam doesn’t allow for 
nuclear weapons: 
Iran will not get emotional in its response to these nonsensical statements, 
because we have often said that our religious tenets and beliefs consider these 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction to be symbols of genocide and are, 
therefore, forbidden and considered to be haram (religiously banned).225 
Unless Khamenei is intentionally misleading the international community, how 
would it be possible to pursue nuclear weapons?  Although, it may be possible that future 
leadership may not have a similar point of view with regard to Islam and nuclear 
weapons.   
More evidence of norms exists.  In a legislative initiative, government officials 
voted on a measure that would ban the production of nuclear weapons.  Although this 
measure failed to pass, it still indicates that norms play a role in Iranian politics.  To 
some, the fact that this measure even became an issue means that the fatwa does not exist, 
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because if the supreme leader had already banned the production of nuclear weapons, 
there would be no need to create a legislative initiative.  The fact that this even came up, 
however, in the Iranian government demonstrates that norms play a role in nuclear 
calculations, though, they may not be strong enough to keep Iran from ultimately 
pursuing nuclear weapons.   
One important aspect of Iran’s state characteristics are the deep divisions that 
exist within the government.  Unfortunately, we cannot be sure of how the divisions are 
affecting Iran’s nuclear choices.  Jeffrey Lewis explains that a variety of viewpoints exist 
within the Iranian government “ranging from those who want the bomb now, to those 
who want a capability, to those who want to demonstrate Iranian scientific achievement 
to the world, to those who don't want a bomb but realize…that if they oppose the uranium 
enrichment program, they will appear to be weak.”226  
In June 2011, President Ahmadinejad admitted the rift between the clerics and 
himself publicly for the first time.  The National reported, “Mr. Ahmadinejad and his 
closest allies alarmed the clerics by seeking to refashion the state's ideology on nationalist 
- rather than Islamist - lines, and to shift its centre of political power from the clergy to 
the presidency.”  The paper continued, “The clerics are also outraged by Mr. 
Ahmadinejad's religious populism. Appealing to a less educated poorer population, he 
claims a direct connection with Shiism's hidden 12th Imam, the messianic Mahdi, and as 
such claims that he doesn't need clerical supervision to govern on Islamic principles.”227  
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Ahmadinejad claimed in a news conference in June 2011 that he and his supporters are 
“180 degrees away from [Khamenei and his supporters]—We are actually on opposite 
sides.” 228  This rift has led Roger Cohen to declare, “That’s not how you make a 
nuke.”229  Jeffrey Lewis concludes, “…[I] don't think any of us know what decision the 
Iranians will make when they actually get to the point where they can build a bomb."230  
Not only have the President and his supporters angered the religious elite, 
particularly Ayatollah Khamenei, the mullahs have also alienated the President and his 
supporters.  The Economist reports, “The supreme leader’s inflexibility now looks like an 
error.  He has infuriated those moderate conservatives who recognise that the events of 
the second half of last year have changed Iran irrevocably, and who advocate concessions 
in the name of national unity.”231 
Shahram Chubin argues that, despite consensus within Iran with regard to the 
right to nuclear energy, no evidence of consensus exists in Iran with regard to nuclear 
weapons—most people just believe that one exists.232  “Divisions on the nuclear question 
exist,” argues Chubin, “and are in fact a surrogate for a broader question: how should 
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Iran relate to the international community?”233  Differences exist within Iran between 
those that “seek a larger role for Iran in the international community as a normal state,” 
argues Chubin, and “those who wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability to continue 
to confront the West….”234 
Ayatollah Khamenei is likely concerned about regime security, and slowly 
building a bomb, he has surely concluded, is only detrimental to regime security.  As 
mentioned above, they have surely taken notice of what the United States and the 
international community have done in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya.  On one hand, 
yes, perhaps this has only solidified the need for a nuclear deterrent capability in the 
minds of Iran’s leadership.  After all, would NATO have intervened in Libya had Qaddafi 
had a nuclear deterrent capability?  This calculation is useless, however, since they are 
building it incredibly slowly, and surely won’t be able to create a deterrent capability any 
time soon, even if they do successfully test a weapon.  Roger Cohen argues: 
Remember, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, is the guardian of the revolution. 
That is a conservative business. Breakout, let alone a bomb, is a bridge too far if 
the Islamic Republic is what you’ve vowed to preserve. Much better to gain 
leverage by producing low-enriched uranium — far from weapons grade — under 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspection and allow rumors to swirl.235 
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Capacity 
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons 
For many, the progress Iran has already made towards enrichment is damning 
evidence that it seeks nuclear weapons.  Recently, the IAEA has stated that its knowledge 
of enrichment activities in the Islamic Republic is diminishing, meaning that the IAEA 
can no longer be certain of Iran’s undeclared enrichment activities.  The IAEA also 
recently claimed that Iran is currently running 8,000 centrifuges used to enrich 
Uranium.236  
As mentioned earlier, Iran currently possesses a significant capacity to enrich 
uranium.  Furthermore, it has a capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but only to a certain 
extent.  Some say that Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability goes far beyond cost-benefit 
analysis and is rather an issue of prestige and defiance.  It could be that Iran is taking the 
road taken by Pakistan, as examined above.  If this is the case, then it doesn’t matter how 
much it costs.  Iran will certainly have the economic capacity if they divert money away 
from other places.  Furthermore, like Pakistan, they will go to great lengths to overcome 
the effects of sanctions put in place by the West.  Peter Cassata reported in January 2009 
that it is estimated that Iran has enough uranium to build “several dozen” nuclear 
                                                
236 Jonathan Tirone, Iran Nuclear Work Advances while UN Scrutinizes New Weapon 
Plans, May 24, 2011, accessed May 24, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
05-24/iran-nuclear-work-advances-while-un-scrutinizes-new-weapon-plans.html.   
   
    88   
weapons.237   He also reported that any effort to stop countries from selling Iran any more 
uranium would likely be unsuccessful.238 
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation 
For years, analysts and commentators have predicted that Iran is only a few years 
away from a bomb, but, as time passes, Iran does not seem any closer to completing a 
nuclear weapon.  But it is possible that Iran may not have either the technical or the 
economic capacity to pursue nuclear weapons.  Even if this capacity exists, it is not 
unlikely that Iranian leadership may perceive forgoing nuclearization as preferential.  
First, Iran may not be able to obtain enough uranium for its ambitious enrichment 
activities.  Second, it may not see the exorbitant cost of its nuclear program worth 
expanding in order to produce enough uranium for a nuclear arsenal. Sadjadpour, Vaez, 
and Ghadar explain:  
The economics of Iran's nuclear approach, however, suggests that its astronomical 
costs appear to dwarf its minimal benefits. The country's lost foreign investment 
in its energy infrastructure -- estimated to be around $60 billion -- is unlikely to 
ever be redeemed by nuclear energy, as power generated by the Bushehr plant can 
only satisfy two percent of Iran's projected electricity consumption. By 
comparison, 18 percent of Iran's electricity is wasted through transmission 
because of technical problems and mismanagement.  The country's scarcity of 
domestic uranium resources and the inefficiency of its obsolete centrifuge 
technology mean that Iran's immense investment in uranium enrichment facilities 
will probably never pay off. In the most optimistic scenario, Iran's projected 
uranium reserves could only supply one nuclear reactor for less than a decade.239  
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Also, the small amount of uranium that Iran is able to mine domestically suffers 
from purity problems.240  This means that Iran has to get its uranium from somewhere 
else, as mentioned above.  We know that Iran attempted to smuggle uranium out of the 
Congo in 2005, but were caught.241  How much uranium is it smuggling?  Is this a 
possible lever for intervention by the international community?  It seems that if the 
international community works together to stop the illegal smuggling of uranium, then 
Iran will be forced to work with what little supply it has.  Furthermore, the more weapons 
like the Stuxnet virus work to delay, complicate, and sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
activities, Iran’s supply of uranium will dwindle even quicker and become less 
productive.   
According to analysts, the recent Stuxnet worm “wiped out roughly a fifth of 
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and helped delay…Tehran’s ability to make its first nuclear 
arms.”242  Furthermore, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claims that sanctions have 
considerably hindered Tehran’s ability to procure components necessary to develop 
nuclear weapons.243  These analysts also claim “sanctions have hurt its effort to build 
more advanced (and less temperamental) centrifuges.”244  Many critics of sanctions often 
complain that they don’t work because they actually create more motivation for the 
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leaders of states to continue what they are doing.  But here, it is not important that Iran’s 
mind is changed.  What is more important is that they lack the capacity.  It would be very 
difficult to change their mind (though, I must admit, if they were already not looking to 
weaponize, this may push them over the edge), and, in this case, it is much easier to 
affect the supply rather than the demand.  With greater internationalization, more states 
have incentive to cooperate with the West.   
This brings up an important point.  Even if Iran is to obtain the bomb in the future 
(or near future), it is because the important changes of the international system have not 
yet pushed other, smaller states, into cooperating with the West.  It is important to 
remember that two things are going on in Iran that affect this analysis.  First, Iran has 
been pursuing the steps to the bomb for quite some time, long before the new effects of 
the emerging multipolar system came into play.  Second, the effects of the emerging 
multipolar system that we can currently observe are in their nascent stages.  They might 
not be mature or developed enough to stop a country that has already gone to great 
lengths to enrich uranium for as long as Iran has; however, even if these things do not 
stop Iran from proliferating, I have demonstrated here that the effects of the multipolar 
international system have hindered, not hastened, Iran’s proliferation decisions.   
 
Conclusions 
When only examining the evidence of Iran’s current nuclear enrichment projects 
with select remarks from President Ahmadinejad, it certainly seems as if Iran is on a path 
to the bomb, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions must be examined in a broader context.  
Furthermore, many Iranian state characteristics are pushing Iran away from pursuing 
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weaponization, and the emerging international system is making the drivers of forgoing 
nuclear weapons capabilities that much stronger.   
Even though Iran is a pariah state with outspoken leaders who attempt to defy the 
West whenever possible, the leadership of Iran is deeply divided.  Furthermore, as Robert 
Baer argues, Iranian leadership is highly calculative, patient, and rational.  The evidence 
presented above demonstrates how such leadership could certainly choose to forgo 
weaponization.  Additionally, it is possible that norms play a role in Iran pushing the 
country away from weaponization.  As examined above, many leaders have claimed that 
nuclear weapons are against Islamic law, and efforts have been made within the 
legislative bodies to ban the production of weapons.  Whereas the forces of these norms 
may not be strong enough by themselves to prevent weaponization, when combined with 
the other drivers, such as the divided leadership, and economic capacity, weaponization 
becomes less likely.   
The emerging international system is also pushing Iran away from weaponization.  
First, as the economy becomes more and more globalized, it is becoming more difficult 
for Tehran to procure the materials needed due to international pressure and regulations 
on supplying states.  Furthermore, as has happened with Turkish banks, international 
pressure on foreign governments has eliminated Tehran’s ability to side-step sanctions.    
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
The case studies examined represent both a best and worst-case test for my 
hypothesis that the emerging international system will not increase nuclear weapons 
proliferation as many analysts and commentators have recently feared.  In both tests, I 
demonstrated that the characteristics of the emerging system will actually push states 
away from pursuing nuclear weapons.  I also demonstrated that state characteristics 
unlikely to be affected by shifts in the emerging system, such as norms or political 
institutions, are capable of only pushing states further from nuclear weapons.  When 
these drivers are examined together, it is unlikely that states will pursue nuclear weapons 
in the emerging system as traditionally expected.  This conclusion will examine the 
similarities, as well as the differences between the likely calculations of both Turkey and 
Iran.   
Security Environment  
As expected by neo-realist theory, the emerging international system is creating a 
less certain security environment for many countries, particularly in the Middle East, but 
this changing security environment is not enough to drive either state towards nuclear 
weapons.  Because the United States will remain the world’s strongest military power and 
has recently flexed its muscles and influence throughout the Middle East, many fear that 
Iran will, as a result of decreased pressure from the international system, attempt to 
balance American power in the region.  As I demonstrated above, however, Tehran may 
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not make the same calculation.  Thus, if Iran will not attempt to balance American power 
in the region with nuclear weapons, then Turkey should not fear an altered security 
environment created by Iran.   
The security environments of each county are drastically different.  That of Iran is 
characterized by mistrust of the international system, long rivalries with neighboring 
states, and the world’s strongest military power surrounding it on most sides, both 
directly and indirectly.  Through Tehran’s quest for self-reliance and perceived need to 
balance against military power, some believe it may turn to nuclear weapons in order to 
fulfill this requirement.  Even though the security environment is changing for both 
states, it is not changing in ways that will make nuclear weapons proliferation more 
likely.  Iran will still likely rely on traditional military capabilities, as well as 
asymmetrical capabilities.  Furthermore, Turkey will likely focus its attention on other 
types of issues, particularly political and economic, as it seeks to further its influence in 
the region.  Turkey, on the other hand, has a longstanding security assurance with the 
United States through NATO as well as no direct military rival.  Instead, the effects of 
Iranian quests for superiority in the region are indirect consequences.  For example, 
Iranian quest for prestige may hinder Turkish goals of becoming a leader in the Middle 
East.   
Economic Interests 
As the economy becomes more globalized, it will dramatically affect the 
calculations and capacities of both Turkey and Iran with regards to nuclear weapons.  As 
mentioned above, Turkey has a strong interest to improve its economic strength, and the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons would destroy this ambition.  Even though the prospects for 
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Turkish EU membership look grim, Ankara still has strong economic ties to Europe.  
These ties will certainly be cut if any evidence of nuclear weapons research were to be 
discovered in Turkey.   But this may not even be an issue should Turkish leadership 
remain persistent in their efforts to join the EU.  Also, as the economy becomes more and 
more globalized, Turkey is working with states that may have a detrimental impact on its 
security environment, as mentioned above with respect to Iranian economic relationships.  
It is clear that the economy of Turkey plays a much stronger role than security concerns, 
and Turkish calculations certainly do not fit the neo-realist mold.  For Turkey, the 
globalizing economy is a positive incentive for Turkey to forgo nuclear considerations.   
Iran, on the other hand, is more likely to be affected by disincentives caused by 
the globalizing economy.  As the international community attempts to stop enrichment in 
Iran, sanctions are becoming more targeted and more focused.  Furthermore, many 
analysts hope that sanctions will eliminate Iranian capacity to fund and supply expensive 
weaponization programs.   
Ideational Factors 
Both Turkey and Iran are looking for prestige as they pursue their goals of 
becoming leaders in the Middle East.  For Turkey, this means becoming an example of a 
secular and democratic government can work in the Islamic world.  For Iran, this means 
increasing its influence in the region and becoming more like the great Persian Empire of 
the past.   
Furthermore, governmental characteristics will certainly play a large role in the 
nuclear calculations and decisions of both states.  For Turkey, as an open and democratic 
society, any decision about nuclear weapons will be much more difficult to pass.  This is 
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exacerbated by the strong environmentalist voices in Turkish politics that will likely not 
approve of nuclear plants or research facilities needed for nuclear weapons programs.  
For Iran, the differences between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad (and 
perhaps future presidents), as well as other factions within the Iranian government, will 
make the coordination of large-scale projects more difficult.   
Finally, norms play a role in both Turkey and Iran, albeit to very different 
degrees.  In Turkey, the strong adherence to norms is genuine.  They are in good standing 
with every WMD treaty, and seek legitimacy within the international community.  Iran, 
on the other hand, does not have nearly as good of a record when it comes to WMD 
norms.  The fact that Tehran has attempt to defy the IAEA and the international 
community time and time again with its uranium enrichment projects is strong evidence 
that Iran is not concerned with norms; however, as demonstrated above, norms still play a 
role, albeit to a much smaller degree than in Turkey.  For example, Ayatollah Khamenei  
has proclaimed time and time again that nuclear weapons are against Islamic principles.  
This is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that norms are a strong enough force to 
keep Tehran from weapons, but it demonstrates that norms exist to some capacity, and 
these are not likely to be changed by the emerging international system.   
Capacity 
Both countries seem to have the capacity, albeit, to different degrees, to obtain a 
nuclear capability.  Turkey has the nuclear know-how, or at least the ability to gain it, 
with regard to nuclear energy (although perhaps not with regard to the tacit knowledge 
required to build a weapon).  Furthermore, it likely has the economic capacity to pursue 
expensive nuclear enrichment and weaponization programs if it so chooses; however, it is 
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not likely that Turkish officials will conclude that nuclear programs will be worth the 
money, and choose to focus on investing in other areas.  Furthermore, Ankara’s economic 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons would significantly decline if they chose to pursue 
them due to the inevitable alienation by the international community.   
Iran, on the other hand, is much more likely to obtain the ability to produce 
nuclear weapons in the future due in large part to two things: it’s current advances in 
nuclear enrichment research and its economic capacity as a result of its large oil supplies.  
Furthermore, Iran has received vital assistance in the past.     
Concluding Remarks 
The research and analysis presented here demonstrate a different future than is 
traditionally expected with multipolar systems.  I have demonstrated many theories and 
hypotheses that do not align with traditional neorealist theories of multipolar systems.  
The emerging system will not be characterized by material rivalry, but by economic 
rivalry and interdependence.  Furthermore, norms and regimes will mitigate power 
struggles that may occur.  Even though nuclear proliferation is not a problem that is going 
to go away, the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons in the emerging multipolar 
international system is not as horrific as many analysts and commentators make it out to 
be.   
In the emerging system, ideational factors will play a stronger role in pushing a 
state to pursue nuclear weapons than material factors.  Ideational and material factors, 
however, cannot be separated.  Whereas these factors may be separated analytically, 
empirically, they are deeply connected and intertwined.  Although capacity and economic 
interests will be pushing states away from nuclearization, ultimately, they way in which 
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state leadership, influenced by their norms, ideas, and the understandings they have of 
their interests, will be the deciding factor.   
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